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Abstract
This paper combines current literature on the heterogeneous firms in inter-
national trade with the public economics of fiscal policy. We study the nexus
between the intensive and extensive margins of trade, and their relationship
with fiscal policy. When taxes are collected through the fixed per-period pro-
duction payments, borne by all active firms, they impact firm partitioning and
exporting decisions, but are nevertheless left unmodelled and treated as a pure
loss in the literature. Instead, we show theoretically how such taxes can be
channelled back into an open economy through spending on education (thereby
affecting workers’ skill distribution in non-trivial ways), and contrast the result
with the standard trade liberalisation exercise and a wasteful channel, which are
prevalent in the literature. We estimate the model’s predictions using a novel
data set covering 40 countries from 1995 to 2011. Employing the instrumental-
variable panel techniques, we find support to our main testable predictions:
fixed production taxes, used as the source to fund education, create an educa-
tional channel on the aggregate expenditure and the extensive margin of trade.
A decrease in expenditure and an increase in the extensive margin are both
amplified once an educational channel is allowed for.
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1 Introduction
Modern trade literature deals with the firm heterogeneity to analyse trade patterns
and explore gains from trade. The seminal contribution by Melitz (2003) has in-
troduced the selection effect when less productive firms are driven out by the more
productive survivors after opening the economy to trade. What drives selection ef-
fects, as demonstrated by Mrázová and Neary (2012), are fixed costs. Yet, there has
been relatively little research digging deeper into the nature of such costs and their
effects on wider economic aggregates.
A prominent counterexample is, however, Do and Levchenko (2009), which demon-
strate that exporters, being larger firms, are more involved in lobbying activity, and
may prefer business regulation, which adversely affect domestic producers. They
demonstrate that higher fixed operating costs drive out relatively inefficient domestic
producers, creating a more regulated and costly environment for the firms to sur-
vive, helping exporters to increase their revenues. Implicitly they are modelling fixed
costs as an expression of bad institutions. Empirically, we find examples when high
taxes correlate with both good and bad institutions (as proxied by the doing-business
costs).1 We, therefore, propose a channel, which could explain such an empirical reg-
ularity: we conjecture that higher production costs can be a pure loss or they can be
channelled back into the productive economy. We argue that the expenditure on edu-
cation (as a share of GDP) affects workers’ skill distribution and the entire economy
in non-trivial ways.
We conjecture that the assumption of fixed costs proxying bad institutions hinge
on another assumption of such costs being a pure loss. Instead, our contribution to
the literature is to introduce a channel through which revenues generated from fixed
costs are channelled back to the economy in form of public goods. It could be useful
to think of revenues generated from fixed costs as the production taxes. These taxes
are part of the total fixed costs. Intuitively, higher costs reduce competition in the
home economy. This helps exporting firms, which can cover fixed costs by enjoying
revenues from the sales abroad. Exporters’ profits are discontinuous at the cutoff
level of exporting productivity. This creates an additional profit margin and lightens
the effect of an increase in fixed costs compared to non-exporters. Additionally, the
most productive firms gain because the measure of active firms drops as the needed
productivity to break even increases. The standard exercise on trade liberalisation is
different from the one on the fixed costs. For any fixed value of trade costs, changes in
cutoff productivities due to fixed costs are nonlinear, with the diminishing effect for
larger values of production costs. We will argue that production costs, unlike trade
bridge, CB3 9DD. Email: roberto.guadarrama-baena@cantab.net and pl312@cam.ac.uk.
1Doing-business costs are costs of running a company and legal procedures. Data are from Doing
Business Report, World Bank. See, in particular, the Appendix 6.3.
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costs, do affect firms’ decisions not only directly, but also through the educational
channel, which changes the distribution of the entire labour force’s abilities. This will
entail additional and non-trivial adjustments in the labour market, which will be fed
back to the production sector.
Our analysis is related to the literature on the political economy of trade policy.
The story entertained by this recent literature emphasises the channel through which
an increase in fixed costs comes about. As mentioned, one of the first contributions
has been done by Do and Levchenko (2009). These authors treat institutional quality
as the inverse of fixed cost and analyse a political economy equilibrium within a
modified median-voter framework. The major mechanism revolves around politically
organised firms with larger ones having exogenous higher political power. Two related
papers are Rebeyrol and Vauday (2009) and Abel-Koch (2013). They both deal with
the mechanism of trade policy (fixed costs) determination. Rebeyrol and Vauday
(2009) analyse a closed-economy and emphasise a discrepancy between the level of
lobbies’ contributions and their political power. In contrast, Abel-Koch (2013) focuses
on border and behind-the-border measures, and the lobbying game based on the
framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994) that gives rise to the equilibrium values
of the two. Lastauskas (2013) focuses on the structural counterfactual levels of trade,
prices and earnings had no excessive obstacles in terms of fixed costs existed. Smeets
et al. (2010); Smeets and Creusen (2011) analyse fixed costs empirically. They find
that poor institutional quality, such as the quality of regulation or the extent of
corruption, can form an important impediment for a firm’s export decision.
The emphasis of the literature still rests with the determination of fixed costs and
their effects on economy. However, fiscal policy is ignored and the costs are treated
as either payments to policy makers or some sort of deadweight loss. What is not
considered is the possibility of such costs (production taxes) forming a basis to fund
public goods and infrastructure needed for business operation. In such a case, the
negative effect on competition could be reversed by the positive effects from a higher
quality of the labour force. We focus on education as the recent literature has concen-
trated on the interaction of labour markets and trade. In this sense, our contribution
is closely related to a number of papers on the analysis of the interplay between wage
inequality, unemployment, and trade. Some examples are, among others, Cosar et al.
(2010), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), Felbermayr et al. (2013). A prominent paper of
introducing a mechanism to improve the quality of the workforce employed by a firm
is due to Helpman et al. (2010). Complementarities between workers’ abilities and
firm productivity lead to the result that exporters end up with better quality labour
force. Recently, Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2014) employed the same framework to ana-
lyse workers’ incentives to invest in higher ability. Lastly, our work also endogenises
the changes in the variance of skill distribution, which has recently been shown to be
as important source of comparative advantage as the skill abundance (see Bombardini
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et al., 2012).2
We extend the framework of Helpman et al. (2010) to allow for the government’s
role to channel the collected taxes back to the economy. These collected taxes take
the form of production taxes. We cover two subcases. On the one hand, the resources
are wasted as in the current literature, whereas on the other hand those resources are
invested in education to improve the ability of the existing workforce. This mechanism
generates the result that the least productive firms leave the market, but among those
firms, which do survive, the proportion of exporters is larger than before such an
intervention. The educational channel entails an additional effect, which makes the
increase in the share of firms, which export, larger. In both subcases this entails a
conflict of interest, where the domestic producers experience their profits reduced,
while the exporters gain. Contrary to the first intuition, this implies that the total
expenditure in the sector (which is a weighted sum of profits) is being reduced as
the measure of surviving firms reduces more than the exporters gain. This effect on
expenditure is again more acute for the educational channel subcase.
Our extension preserves the tractability and enables the analysis of the distribu-
tion of profits across exporting and non-exporting firms. We contribute to the current
literature by analysing government intervention through education expenditure, which
affects workers’ skill distribution by raising their ability, thereby helping firms to be
more productive. Moreover, we derive testable implications, which lend themselves to
the empirical analysis on trade, GDP and government expenditure. For this purpose,
we construct a novel data base, which quantifies the extensive margin of trade using
the world input-output tables. Technically, we use the overlapping variation of the
total government’s expenditure with that of spending on education. We find support
for the theoretically derived propositions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical
model of trade and lays the foundations for the comparative statics of the equilib-
rium. This comparative analysis and the results from the simulation exercises are
presented in Section 3, where we also state the main testable predictions. Section 4
empirically investigates the relationship between fixed costs (production taxes), the
extensive margin of trade and the aggregate expenditure. We conclude with Section 5
including some additional remarks. Finally, the Appendix collects various theoretical
derivations and tables containing the empirical results and data sources.3
2Bombardini et al. (2012) demonstrate that skill dispersion has a comparable effect to skill abund-
ance in shaping comparative advantage. Authors demonstrate that firms in sectors with higher com-
plementarity are relatively more productive in countries with lower skill dispersion. Therefore, we
provide a mechanism that can rationalise differences among economies in skill distribution.
3There is also an accompanying online Appendix, which reports further robustness checks and
simulation results.
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2 Theoretical trade model
In this section, we lay down the main theoretical blocks of the extended version of
Helpman et al. (2010). To ease comparability, we follow the terminology and notation
from Helpman et al. (2010) as closely as possible. The framework is based on Melitz
(2003) combined with the search and matching frictions in the labour market approach
of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and a screening technology. We concentrate on
the risk neutral agents who consume goods from homogeneous and heterogeneous
sectors. The latter produces a measure of varieties, which are combined into the ag-
gregate basket using a constant elasticity of substitution aggregator. Trade is covered
in a two-country setting, which partitions firms into exporters and non-exporters. We
derive explicit expressions for a profitability and aggregate expenditure to learn how
fixed costs are channelled within the economy.
Effectively, the free entry condition allows us establish a conflict in interest between
exporters and non-exporters. In other words, a change in fixed costs affects them in
an opposite way: the productivity needed to produce domestically increases, whereas
the one for exporting decreases. This change in fixed costs stems from a change in
the production taxes. That is to say, we think of production taxes as part of the
total fixed costs. Therefore, the extensive margin of trade (i.e., the proportion of
firms that export) tends to increase with fixed costs. However, aggregate expenditure
suffers, and even more so when there is an educational channel at work. In the
educational channel, the government channels back to the economy the receipts from
taxing the private sector. These resources are spent on expenditure on education,
which increases the ability of workers and due to parametric assumptions, the whole
skill distribution. Hence, the total welfare suffers, also confirmed by the increasing
aggregate price index.
2.1 Consumers
Let us deal with a model with a single type of worker. In order to determine ex-
pected worker income (ω), prices and aggregate income, we embed the sector in a
general equilibrium. We assume that preferences, which are defined over an aggregate
consumption index (C), exhibit constant relative risk aversion:
U = 11− ηEC
1−η, 0 ≤ η < 1, (2.1)
where E is the expectations operator. Workers are assumed to be risk neutral, η = 0.4
The aggregate consumption index is defined over consumption of a homogeneous good
q0 (the outside good) and a real consumption index Q including differentiated varieties
4One of the implications is that the expected indirect utility is given by V = E (w/P) , where P
is the price index of the aggregate consumption index C.
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as follows:
C =
[
ϑ1−ζqζ0 + (1− ϑ)1−ζ Qζ
] 1
ζ , 0 < ζ < 1. (2.2)
The parameter ϑ ≥ 0 determines the relative weight of the homogeneous and the
differentiated goods, whereas the parameter ζ governs the degree of substitutability
between sectors.5 As P is the dual of the aggregate consumption index C, it can be
expressed as:
P =
[
ϑp0 + (1− ϑ)P−
ζ
1−ζ
]− 1−ζ
ζ
. (2.3)
An indifference condition between sectors is used in order to pin down the expected
worker income in the differentiated sector. This condition requires the expected utility
of entering any sector to be equal. Since workers are assumed to be risk neutral, the so-
called Harris-Todaro condition implies that the expected income in the differentiated
sector equals the wage of one in the homogeneous sector:6
ω = 1.
Given an expected income of one in each sector, aggregate income in the home country,
Ω, is equal to its total labour endowment:
Ω = ωL¯ = L¯, (2.4)
where L¯ = L0 +L and L0 is employment in the homogeneous sector; similarly for the
foreign country.
Then the price index in the differentiated sector is uniquely determined from the
equilibrium choices of consumers and aggregate income (Ω). When both goods are
produced, workers in the differentiated sector receive the same expected indirect utility
as those in the homogeneous sector, therefore making the indirect utility equal to 1/P .
Thus, the opening of the economy to trade affects expected welfare only through
changes in the aggregate price index (P).
We now solve for the optimal demand choices by the consumers. Using equations
(2.1) and (2.2), the problem for maximising the expected utility is
5As is standard in this type of models, the product market is assumed to be perfectly competitive
in the outside sector and there are no labour market frictions. Moreover, one unit of labour is
required to produce one unit of output q0 in this sector, where, additionally, there are no trade costs.
Therefore, after choosing the outside good as the numeraire (p0 = 1), the wage in this sector is equal
to unity. This holds for both the home and the foreign countries.
6Note that the wage in the homogeneous sector is certain. Moreover, incomplete specialisation
(where both goods are produced) can be guaranteed by a suitable choice of labour endowments in the
differentiated sector in the home country, L, and in the foreign country L? (where foreign variables
will be denoted with an asterisk), and relative weight of the homogeneous good and the differentiated
sector (ϑ).
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max
q0,q(j) j∈J
U =E
[
ϑ1−ζqζ0 + (1− ϑ)1−ζ Qζ
] 1
ζ
s.t. Ω = q0 +
ˆ
j∈J
p(j)q(j)dj. (2.5)
The first order conditions of the consumer’s problem for good 0 and j are, respectively:
λ =C1−ζϑ1−ζqζ−10 (2.6)
λ =C1−ζ (1− ϑ)1−ζ Qζ−1 ∂Q
∂q(j)p(j)
−1, ∀j ∈ J, (2.7)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint, and we used the
definition of a consumption bundle, C1−ζ =
[
ϑ1−ζqζ0 + (1− ϑ)1−ζ Qζ
] 1
ζ
−1
. Combining
equations (2.6) and (2.7), and using the CES aggregator for differentiated goods (refer
to the equation (8.1) in Appendix) to solve for ∂Q
∂q(j) =
[´
j∈J q (j)
β dj
] 1−β
β q (j)β−1 =
Q1−βq (j)β−1, we obtain the demand for homogeneous good:
q0 =
(
ϑ
1− ϑ
)
QP
1
1−ζ , (2.8)
where E = PQ is the total expenditure on varieties within the differentiated sector,
and the demand for the differentiated good is given by:
q (j′) =p(j′)−
1
1−βQP
1
1−β =
(
A
p (j′)
) 1
1−β
∀j′ ∈ J. (2.9)
The reader is referred to the Appendix 8.1 for all the details regarding demand,
including firm and aggregate measures.
2.2 Firms
Firm take consumers’ choices from previous subsection as given. Given the specific-
ation of sectoral demand from the equation (2.9), the equilibrium revenue of a firm
is
r (j) = p (j) q (j) = Aq (j)β = p(j)−
β
1−βA
1
1−β . (2.10)
In the product market there is a number of potential firms, which pay an entry cost
of fe > 0 to enter the differentiated sector. After a firm pays the sunk entry cost,
it observes its productivity θ, which is independently distributed and drawn from a
Pareto distribution Gθ (θ) with θ ≥ θmin > 0 and shape parameter z > 1. Once a
firm observes its productivity, it chooses whether to exit and whether to produce just
for the domestic market or for both the domestic and the export markets. Moreover,
a firm incurs the production’s fixed cost, fd = f ′d + td > 0, which is made of two
components. The first component, f ′d, is strictly fixed and can be interpreted as,
for example, the cost of building a factory. It could also be thought of as red-tape
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or corruption-related costs of starting and operating a business. We call the second
component, td, the production tax. This tax is set by the government and, unlike f ′d,
it does generate revenues for the government. The production tax can be interpreted
as a payment to the government for a permission or licence to run a firm. This
representation will be useful when we introduce the government in the next section.
On the other hand, if the firm exports it also pays a fixed cost of exporting fx > 0.
All f ′d, td, and fx are being expressed in terms of units of the numeraire. Additionally,
there is an iceberg variable trade cost, τ > 1, in units of a variety, in order for one
unit to arrive in the foreign market. The firm’s output of each variety, y, is a function
of the productivity of the firm θ, the measure of workers that the firm hires h, and
the mean ability of these hired workers a¯. As a result the output is expressed as
y(θ) = θhγ a¯, 0 < γ < 1. (2.11)
A key feature of this framework is that technology entails complementarities in worker
ability. Note that the productivity of each hired worker is increasing in the average
ability of the other workers hired. Then the framework closely follows Helpman et al.
(2010) – we, thus, describe in detail firm’s search strategy, screening costs, and work-
ers’ abilities, distributed and drawn from a Pareto distribution with shape parameter
k, such that Ga (a) = 1−
(
amin
a
)k
for a ≥ amin > 0 and k > 1, in the Appendix 8.1.1.
Despite the rich structure, the recursivity allows solving the model in a simple
manner. First, the firm decides whether or not to produce and export depending on
its productivity draw. After these decisions have been made, the firm and its hired
workers participate in a strategic bargaining game. This game, with equal bargaining
weights, is over the division of the revenue from production. This is modelled in
the same way as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b). Before the bargaining stage, fixed
production, fixed exporting, search and screening costs are all been sunk. As a result
all other arguments of the firm revenue are fixed. We now analyse revenue and profit
functions in more depth, before solving for the equilibrium.
2.2.1 Revenues
A firm, which sells to the foreign market, will always serve the domestic market, too.
This is because of consumers’ love of variety and the existence of a fixed production
cost. If exporting, a firm distributes its output y (θ) between the domestic market
yd (θ) and the export market yx (θ) in order to equate its marginal revenues in the two
markets. This implies, from the equation (2.10), that
(
yx(θ)
yd(θ)
)1−β
= τ−β
(
A?
A
)
. Hence,
we can express total revenues of a firm as follows:
r (θ) ≡ rd (θ) + rx (θ) = Υ (θ)1−β Ay (θ)β , (2.12)
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where rd (θ) ≡ Ayd (θ)β are revenues from serving the domestic market, while rx (θ) ≡
A?
(
yx(θ)
τ
)
β are those from serving the foreign market.7 The variable Υ (θ) – capturing
the market access by a firm – is determined by the decision to sell to both the home
and foreign markets or solely to the home market:
Υ (θ) ≡ 1 + Ix (θ) τ−
β
1−β
(
A?
A
) 1
1−β ≥ 1, (2.13)
where Ix (θ) is an indicator variable equal to one (zero) if the firm chooses (not) to
export. Note that the intensive margin of trade, Υ (θ) = y(θ)
yd(θ) , is constant across firms
since Υ (θ) = 1 + Ix (θ)
[
τ−β
(
A?
A
)] 1
1−β is just a function of aggregate (per sector)
variables. That is, from Υx (θ) = 1 + yx(θ)yd(θ) , for any θ > θx a firm exports a constant
share of its total production. Moreover, from equation the (2.11), note that Υ (θ) =
θhγ a¯
θhγ
d
a¯d
, a useful expression for a few yet to be derived results.
2.2.2 Profits
Anticipating the outcome of the bargaining game, the firm chooses to maximise its
net profits. Using the production technology with Pareto-based worker’s ability and
hiring rate with revenues equation (2.12), and using the equation (2.13), the profit
maximisation problem of a firm is the following:
pi (θ) = max
n ≥ 0
ac ≥ amin
Ix ∈ {0, 1}
 11 + βγ
1 + Ix (θ) τ− β1−β (A?
A
) 1
1−β
1−β ·
A
(
κyθn
γa1−γkc
)β − bn− c
δ
aδc − fd − Ixfx
. (2.14)
We concentrate on the parameter space such that θx > θd > θmin. This is done by
appropriate choice of trade costs.8
It is important to find out the threshold level of screening ability, which follows
from the first order condition with respect to ac of the profit function equation (2.14):
β(1−γk)
1+βγ r(θ) = ca
δ
c(θ),
where r(θ) = Υ (θ)1−β A
(
κyθn
γa1−γkc
)β
. The first order condition with respect to the
measure of workers sampled, n, of the profit function equation (2.14) is as follows:
7Note that
(
yx(θ)
yd(θ)
)1−β
= τ−β
(
A?
A
)
together with yd (θ) + yx (θ) = y (θ) imply yd (θ) = y(θ)Υ(θ) and
yx (θ) = y(θ)Υ(θ) (Υ (θ)− 1), and hence rd (θ) = r(θ)Υ(θ) and rx (θ) = r(θ)Υ(θ) (Υ (θ)− 1).
8This is line with the empirical literature showing evidence of selection into export markets, where
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βγ
1+βγ r(θ) = bn(θ).
Notice that screening depends on the productivity of the firm, so there is a clear
mapping between the two:
(1− γk) bn(θ) =γcaδc(θ).
Using r(θ), we can now solve explicitly for both ac (θ) and n(θ):
ac (θ) =φac
[
Υ (θ)1−β Aθβcβγ−1b−βγ
] 1
δΓ , (2.15a)
n(θ) =φn
[
Υ (θ)1−β Aθβc−
β(1−γk)
δ b−(βγ+Γ)
] 1
Γ
, (2.15b)
where φac ≡
[
βγ
1+βγ
(
1−γk
γ
)1−βγ
κβy
] 1
δΓ
and φn ≡ φδac γ1−γk =
[
βγ
1+βγ
(
1−γk
γ
)1−βγ−Γ
κβy
] 1
Γ
.
Note that 1 > γk > 0 has to hold for the firm to have an incentive to screen. Recall
that 1 > γ > 0, and that δ > k > 1 must hold in order to admit an employer-size wage
premium. Moreover, knowing that βγ1+βγ r(θ) = bn(θ), firm revenue, equation (2.12),
can be solved explicitly for r(θ) as a function of sectoral variables (A, b), parameters,
and the firm productivity θ:
r (θ) =
(
βγ
1 + βγ
)−1
φn
[
Υ (θ)1−β Aθβc−
β(1−γk)
δ b−βγ
] 1
Γ
, (2.16)
where Γ ≡ 1− β
δ
(1− γk)− βγ > 0. Finally, using the two first-order conditions in
the firm’s problem equation (2.14), profits for each firm drawing productivity θ can be
expressed in terms of the firm revenue and the fixed production and exporting costs
as follows:9
pi (θ) = Γ1 + βγ r (θ)− fd − Ix (θ) fx. (2.17)
2.2.3 Other firm-specific variables
.
We can explicitly write firm-level variables as functions solely dependent on the
sectoral variable b, the firm productivity θ and consequently the firm market access
Υ (θ), the zero-profit productivity cutoff θd, and parameters. For this purpose, we
consider the threshold domestic producer, which makes a zero profit. By using the
equation (2.16) and imposing pi (θ) = 0 from the equation (2.17), we obtain that
fd =
Γ
1 + βγ r (θd) =
Γ
βγ
φn
[
Ac−
β(1−γk)
δ b−γβ
] 1
Γ
θ
β
Γ
d . (2.18)
only the most productive firms are able to serve the foreign market.
9Note that pi (θ) should be thought of as the per-period net profit, whereas the average long-run
net profit is equal to the sunk entry cost fe in order for the free-entry condition to hold.
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As a result, the firm-specific revenue function is as follows:
r (θ) =
(
1 + βγ
Γ
)
Υ (θ)
1−β
Γ fd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
, (2.19)
where we substituted
[
Ac−
β(1−γk)
δ b−γβ
] 1
Γ
from the equation (2.18). Similarly, we obtain
the firm-specific ability threshold and the measure of workers sampled, respectively:
ac (θ) =
[
β (1− γk)
Γ
] 1
δ
Υ (θ) 1−βΓ fd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ

1
δ
c−
1
δ , (2.20)
n(θ) =
(
βγ
Γ
)
Υ (θ)
1−β
Γ fd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
b−1 . (2.21)
Considering the first order conditions from the firm’s problem, we can express wage
bill as
w (θ) =
Υ (θ) 1−βΓ fd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ

k
δ
φw, (2.22)
where φw ≡ b
[
β(1−γk)
Γ
1
aδmin
] k
δ
c−
k
δ , and the measure of workers hired as
h (θ) =
(
βγ
Γ
)
φ−1w
Υ (θ) 1−βΓ fd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
1−
k
δ
. (2.23)
Finally, the optimal supply of variety j with productivity θ is
y (θ) =κynγa1−γkc θ
=φ
1
β
p
(
1 + βγ
Γ
) [
cγ−
1−Γ
β b−γ
]
f
1−Γ
β
d θ
− 1−ΓΓ
d Υ (θ)
1−β
Γ ( 1−Γβ ) θ 1Γ , (2.24)
where φp ≡
(
Γ
βγ
φn
)Γ (1+βγ
Γ
)1−β
.
2.3 Equilibrium
As already mentioned, the model is solved exploiting its recursive structure. We
first analyse labour market outcomes, then feed them into the production side of
the economy, and uncover cut-off productivities. They are then essential to uncover
aggregate variables, and explore welfare implications and conduct comparative statics.
2.3.1 Labour market details
The strategic bargaining game determines that the total wage bill is a constant share
of revenue. This further implies that firm wages are monotonically increasing in
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the screening ability cut-off. Hence, dividing the latter first order condition by the
measure of hired workers, h (θ) , we obtain that
w (θ) = βγ1 + βγ
r (θ)
h (θ) = b
n (θ)
h (θ) = b
[
ac (θ)
amin
]k
. (2.25)
As a result, firms with larger revenues have higher screening ability cut-offs. They
also pay higher wages, however, the expected wage for a worker given that it has been
sampled is the same across firms in the sector. Then we obtain that
w (θ)h (θ)
n (θ) = b. (2.26)
Note that this implies that workers have no incentive to direct their search. To pin
down b, recall that the standard Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides assumption implies
that the search cost b is increasing in the labour market tightness:
b = α0xα1 , α0 > 1, α1 > 0.
Labour market tightness is defined as a ratio of workers sampled, N , to workers
searching for employment, L, that is x ≡ N/L. Given identical expected income in
two sectors, ω = xb, it follows that
b = α1/(1+α1)0 ωα1/(1+α1).
2.3.2 Cutoff productivities
By using the equation (2.16), the zero profit condition for the domestic producer r (θd)
from the equation (2.17) yields:
fd =
Γ
1 + βγ r (θd)
= Γ
βγ
φn
[
Ac−
β(1−γk)
δ b−βγ
] 1
Γ
θ
β
Γ
d , (2.27)
which solves θd as a function of parameters, screening technology c, search cost b, and
fixed cost fd, for a given value of demand shifter A.
On the other hand, by considering the equation (2.16) and the zero profit condition
for the exporter r (θx) from the equation (2.17), we obtain the export productivity
threshold θx as a function of parameters, technology and the various costs, for a given
demand shifter A. Hence,
fx =
Γ
1 + βγ r (θx)− fd
= Γ
βγ
φn
[
Ac−
β(1−γk)
δ b−βγ
] 1
Γ
θ
β
Γ
x
(
Υx
1−β
Γ − 1
)
, (2.28)
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where we substituted fd from the equation (2.27) evaluated at θx. Dividing equation
(2.28) by the equation (2.27), we obtain θx as a function of θd:
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Υx
1−β
Γ − 1
)(θx (θd (fd))
θd (fd)
)β
Γ
= fx
fd
. (2.29)
Note that θd is itself a function of fd, where fd is taken as given by firms. Moreover,
ρ ≡ θd
θx
∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as an extensive margin of trade openness as it
determines the fraction of exporting firms, [1−Gθ(θx)][1−Gθ(θd)] = ρ
z.
The intuition about the cut-off productivities is visualised in Figure 2.1. A stand-
ard exercise in the trade literature focuses on trade liberalisation, usually modelled
as a reduction in variable trade costs. It is clear, however, that fixed costs fd affect
domestic firms’ and exporters’ productivities (θd and θx, respectively) differently from
a change in variable trade costs. For any fixed value of trade costs, changes in cutoff
productivities due to fixed costs are nonlinear, with diminishing effect for larger values
of fd. We will argue in the following sections that production costs, unlike trade costs,
do affect firms’ decisions not only directly but also through the educational channel,
which changes the distribution of the entire labour force’s abilities. This will entail
adjustments in the labour market, which will be fed back to the production sector.
Figure 2.1: The production taxes, trade costs, and cut-off productivities
for non-exporter (lower surface) and exporter (upper surface)
The intensive margin of trade openness, as captured by the market access variable,
Υx > 1, determines the ratio of revenues from domestic sales and exporting. These
two dimensions of trade openness are linked through the relationship between the
productivity cut-offs, as reported in the equation (2.29). Moreover, we must equate
the expected value of entry to the sunk entry cost, which is required for the free entry
condition to hold:
fe =p¯i − fd [1−G(θd)]− fx [1−G(θx)] ,
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where p¯i ≡ ´∞
θd
Γ
1+βγ r (θ) gθ (θ) dθ is the average operating profit (before fixed costs) for
all the firms in the economy. We can further partition this profit for the whole economy
into its part, where only the non-exporter is considered. Hence, we express p¯id ≡´ θx
θd
Γ
1+βγ r (θ) gθ (θ) dθ as the average operating profit for the non-exporter. Making
use of these definitions, in the following statement, we re-express these profits in terms
of the fixed costs and the extensive margin of trade ρ, the variables of utmost interest
to us.
Lemma 1. The average operating profit in the economy is proportional to the weighted
sum of fixed costs, adjusted for the probability of survival, (θmin/θd)z ≡ 1 − Gθ (θd).
The average operating profit for the non-exporter, in turn, is proportional to the fixed
production costs only, adjusted for the probability of survival.
Proof. Re-expressing p¯i by using r (θ) from equation (2.19) yields:
p¯i =
ˆ ∞
θd
Γ
1 + βγ
(
Γ
1 + βγ
)−1
Υ (θ)
1−β
Γ fd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
gθ (θ) dθ
=
(
θmin
θd
)z
(fd + fxρz)
(
zΓ
zΓ− β
)
> 0, (2.30)
where we used the fact that
´ θx
θd
Ix (θ) = 0, which implies Υ (θ) = 1 for this range, and
that
´∞
θx
Ix (θ) = 1, which implies Υ (θ) = Υx for this other range. We also imposed
β
Γ − z < 0 in order for the integral to be well defined. Similarly, the average operating
profit for the non-exporter, p¯id, can be also re-expressed as:
p¯id =
(
θmin
θd
)z
fd
(
1− ρz−βΓ
)( zΓ
zΓ− β
)
> 0, (2.31)
where the procedure to obtain this follows the same logic used in obtaining p¯i but for
the range θ ∈ [θd, θx).
In words, the average operating profit in the economy entails fixed production and
exporting costs, the latter adjusted for the fraction of exporting firms, ρz. It also
adjusts for the parameters from the consumer and technology sides (Γ and β). In
contrast, the domestic profit, since a domestic producer does not incur in the fixed
cost fx, considers fixed cost of production further adjusted by a factor (smaller than
one), which entails the extensive margin of trade. With these definitions in hand, the
free entry condition is seen as equating the free entry cost fe to the probability of
survival multiplied by fixed costs of production and exporting. As a result, using p¯i
from the equation (2.30), we re-express the free entry condition as:
fe =
(
θmin
θd
)z
(fd + fxρz)
(
β
zΓ− β
)
, (2.32)
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where we used [1−G(θd)] =
(
θmin
θd
)z
and [1−G(θx)] =
(
θmin
θx
)z
from the Pareto
distribution. With this entry condition at hand, we can have a useful expression
for the average and non-exporter operating profits as functions of parameters, the
extensive margin of trade, and the free entry sunk cost fe. For this purpose we state
the following lemma:
Lemma 2. The average operating profit in the economy is proportional to the entry
cost. On the other hand, the average operating profit for the non-exporter is propor-
tional to the economy-wide average profit p¯i, adjusted for the weighted sum of fixed
costs.
Proof. Re-expressing p¯i and p¯id by using fe from equation (2.32) yields, respectively:
p¯i =zΓ
β
· fe, and (2.33)
p¯id =
zΓ
β
· fe ·
fd
(
1− ρz−βΓ
)
fd + fxρz
. (2.34)
In words, the free entry condition implies that the sunk cost to obtain a productivity
draw is equal to the sum of weighted fixed costs, borne every period when the firm
is active. Note also that the entry cost is equal to p¯i scaled by a factor of β
zΓ < 1.
That is, this factor accounts for Γ, for the elasticity of substitution entailed in β, and
for the mean and variance of the productivities of the firms through z. Recall that
z is a sufficient statistic for both moments as the firm productivity is drawn from a
Pareto distribution. By contrast, p¯id has also the same proportionality factor as p¯i,
but is further adjusted by fd
(
1−ρz−
β
Γ
)
/fd+fxρz < 1.
The average operating profit of the economy is itself the sum of the average oper-
ating profits of the domestic producer and the exporter. Thus the average operating
profit for the exporter only is p¯ix ≡
´∞
θx
Γ
1+βγ r (θ) gθ (θ) dθ, and is also a function of
parameters, the entry cost and ρ as follows:
p¯ix =p¯i − p¯id
=zΓ
β
· fe ·
fdρz−βΓ + fxρz
fd + fxρz
 . (2.35)
Evidently, when there is no trade, ρ = 0, there is no difference between the two profits.
In case when the economy is fully open (all firms engage in trade), p¯i − p¯id = zΓβ · fe,
the difference is just equal to the profit of an average firm as purely domestic firms
are absent in the economy.
Now we can solve for θd, θx, andA by substituting θd from the equation (2.27) to
the equation (2.32):
fe =
θzmin
(
Γ
βγ
φn
)z Γ
β(
c
(1−γk)
δ bγ
)z
(
β
zΓ− β
)f 1−z Γβd + fx
Υx (A,A∗) 1−βΓ − 1
fx
z Γβ
A zβ . (2.36)
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This equation solves for the demand-shifter of the sector, A, as a function of para-
meters, screening technology, fixed, sunk, and search costs, for given values of foreign
demand shifter A∗, which affects the solution only through the intensive margin of
trade Υx. This solution can then be used to solve for P (refer to the Appendix and
use the equation (8.5)). Recall that z − βΓ > 0, and note that the equation (2.36) is
non-linear in A because of Υx (A,A∗). However, in a symmetric equilibrium A = A∗,
thus implying Υx = 1 + τ−
β
1−β . Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium, equation (2.36)
can be solved analytically for A as a function of parameters, fixed, sunk, and search
costs.
2.3.3 Aggregate variables
Consider now the utility maximisation problem by the consumers (refer to the equa-
tion (2.5)). Optimising across sectors and varieties, the sectoral price index for the
differentiated sector P is a function of the demand shifter A and the aggregate income
Ω (see equation (8.5) in the Appendix). In Subsection 2.3.2 above, A has already been
solved for by the equation (2.36). Moreover, by using the solution for P , one can solve
for the optimal real consumption index of the differentiated sector Q.
To determine the mass of firms within the sector M , we make use of the market
clearing condition. This condition states that the total expenditure on the differen-
tiated sector, E = PQ, equals total revenues of domestic and foreign firms that sell
differentiated goods to the domestic market. As a result,
E =M
ˆ ∞
θd
rd (θ) gθ (θ) dθ +M∗
ˆ ∞
θ∗x
r∗x (θ) gθ (θ) dθ
=M
ˆ ∞
θd
r (θ)
Υ (θ)gθ (θ) dθ +M
∗
ˆ ∞
θ∗x
(
Υ (θ)∗ − 1
Υ (θ)∗
)
r (θ)∗ gθ (θ) dθ
=1 + βγΓ
[(
Υx − 1
Υx
)(
p¯id +
p¯i
Υx − 1
)
M +
(
Υ∗x − 1
Υ∗x
)
(p¯i∗ − p¯i∗d)M∗
]
, (2.37)
where we used the fact that
´∞
θx
Γ
1+βγ r (θ) gθ (θ) dθ = p¯i− p¯id. Equation (2.37), together
with a similar equation for the foreign country, can then be used to solve for M and
M∗. For the balanced trade condition to hold, total imports (M∗
´∞
θ∗x
r∗x (θ) gθ (θ) dθ)
must equal total exports (M
´∞
θx
rx (θ) gθ (θ) dθ). As a result, equation (2.37) becomes
PQ = E =M
ˆ ∞
θd
r (θ)
Υ (θ)gθ (θ) dθ +M
ˆ ∞
θx
(
Υ (θ)− 1
Υ (θ)
)
r (θ) gθ (θ) dθ
=1 + βγΓ Mp¯i. (2.38)
Total expenditure is just a weighted sum of all the profits made by firms in the
economy, both purely domestic ones and exporters.
First, we determine the mass of workers searching for employment in the differen-
tiated sector, L, from the requirement that the sector’s total wage bill equals L, which
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ensures that the ex ante expected wage for every worker searching for employment in
the differentiated sector equals one. That is,
L =M
ˆ ∞
θd
w (θ)h (θ) gθ (θ) dθ = M
ˆ ∞
θd
βγ
1 + βγ r(θ)gθ (θ) dθ
=βγΓ Mp¯i, (2.39)
where the second equality follows from the equation (2.25) manipulations of p¯i ≡´∞
θd
Γ
1+βγ r (θ) gθ (θ) dθ.
Since in the monopolistic competition each variety j is produced by just one firm,
we replaced the variety symbol j with the firm’s productivity θ. We then re-express
the inverse demand function equation (2.9), after using the market clearing condition
q (θ) = y (θ), as
p(θ)−
β
1−β =A−
β
1−β y (θ)β . (2.40)
Thus, substituting the optimal supply of a firm with the productivity θ from the
equation (2.24) to the equation (2.40) yields the optimal price relation:
p(θ)−
β
1−β =A−
β
1−β
(
1 + βγ
Γ
)β
φp
[
cγ−
1−Γ
β b−γ
]β
f 1−Γd θ
−β 1−ΓΓ
d Υ (θ)
1−β
Γ (1−Γ) θ
β
Γ
=
(
1 + βγ
Γ
)
A−
β
1−βA−1fdθ
−βΓ
d Υ (θ)
1−β
Γ (1−Γ) θ
β
Γ , (2.41)
where the second equality, which will be useful below, substitutes A for the search and
screening cost b and c. Moreover, the real consumption index for the differentiated
sector, Q, equation (8.1), can be re-expressed as
Q =
[ˆ
j∈J
q (j)β dj
] 1
β
=
ˆ
j∈J
(
A
p(j)
) β
1−β
dj

1
β
=
[ˆ
j∈J
p(j)−
β
1−β dj
] 1
β
A
1
1−β . (2.42)
Thus, by using A ≡ E1−βP β and E = PQ, we can solve for Q as function of the
demand shifter and the ideal price index P , Q = A
1
1−βP−
1
1−β . As a result, the ideal
price level P can be expressed as
P =
[ˆ
j∈J
p(j)−
β
1−β dj
]− 1−β
β
. (2.43)
Note that, unlike models with one sector only, the price index P though dual to Q
is not defined up to a single normalisation. In the Appendix (see Subsection 8.4), we
show that the very existence of the outside sector (the homogeneous sector) makes
P−1 and Q not homogeneous of degree zero.
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Consider now the optimal pricing rule by each firm with productivity θ and in-
tegrate according to the optimal price index P . This procedure leads us to establish
the optimal price index as a function of parameters, the demand shifter A, and the
profits from domestic producer and the economy as a whole. This result is important
when it comes to measuring welfare and learning how production costs are channeled
into the price index.
Lemma 3. The ideal price index P is proportional to the demand shifter A and a
weighted average of the operating profit for the whole economy and the non-exporters.
Proof. Substitute equation (2.41) into the price index, equation (2.43). Then, consider
all active firms in the economy, which actually produce, i.e., those with θ ≥ θd.
Recalling that firms draw their productivity from the cumulative distribution Gθ (θ) =
1 −
(
θmin
θ
)z
, the probability density function is gθ(θ) = zθzminθ−z−1. As a result, the
optimal price index is the following:
P =
[ˆ ∞
θd
A−
β
1−βA−1
(
1 + βγ
Γ
)
fdθ
−βΓ
d Υ (θ)
1−β
Γ (1−Γ) θ
β
Γ gθ(θ)dθ
]− 1−β
β
=A
1
β
(
Γ
1 + βγ
) 1−β
β [
p¯id
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ p¯iΥβ−1x
]− 1−β
β , (2.44)
where z − βΓ > 0 must hold in order for the integral to be well defined. We also
used equations (2.30) and (2.31) to express the object in the square brackets. See the
Appendix for the whole derivation.
Note that the price level entails a relationship between the interest of the domestic
only producers and the exporters (contained in p¯i). This relationship is adjusted by
the intensive margin of trade Υ and the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
With this representation, one can easily extract various components from the price
level. This manipulation helps to establish the following lemma, which will be useful
for constructing the testable prediction, covered in the next section.
Lemma 4. Total expenditure in the sector E is a weighted sum of operating profits
for the whole economy and the non-exporters, being adjusted by a factor 1+βγ/Γ > 1.
Proof. By using the demand shifter definition in equation (8.5), note that, since
A
1
βE
β−1
β = P , the following holds:
E =
(
1 + βγ
Γ
) [
p¯id
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ p¯iΥβ−1x
]
=
(
1 + βγ
β
)
z · fe
fd
(
1− ρz−βΓ
)
fd + fxρz
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ Υβ−1x
 , (2.45)
where P is from the equation (2.44) .
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The expenditure function combines the firms’ productivity heterogeneity para-
meter z, fixed costs of production and exporting, fd and fx, sunk costs fe, and inter-
action between the intensive, Υx, and extensive, ρ, trade margins. Note that under
no trade, expenditure is given by E =
(
1+βγ
β
)
zfe, whereas a fully open economy im-
plies E =
(
1+βγ
β
)
zfeΥβ−1x . The ratio of these two counter-factual expenditure levels is
simply an intensive trade margin, adjusted for the elasticity of substitution, Υβ−1x < 1.
Note that the weighted sum of operating profits can be expressed explicitly in terms
of p¯ix by using equation (2.35), thus E =
(
1+βγ
Γ
) [
p¯id + p¯ixΥβ−1x
]
.
Considering the market clearing condition from the equation (2.38) and the equa-
tion (2.45), we can express the mass of firms within the sector as a weighted average
of operating profits p¯i and p¯id per unit of p¯i:
M =
p¯id
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ p¯iΥβ−1x
p¯i
.
Note that from the consumers optimisation problem in equation (8.4), we can obtain
that E = PQ = Ω
[(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
P
1
1−ζ + P
]−1
P , which, after using equation (2.45), solves
for another representation for P :
P =
(
Ω− E
E
) 1−ζ
ζ
(
1− ϑ
ϑ
) 1−ζ
ζ
. (2.46)
We can, alternatively, express the price level as an explicit function of sectoral
variables, parameters, technology, fd and θd. Then P is as follows:
P =
[
φ−1p c
−Γ+1−βγbγβθ−βd f
Γ
d
] 1
β
[
p¯id
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ p¯iΥβ−1x
]− 1−β
β . (2.47)
This representation might prove useful when allowing for the government to play a
role in manipulating the production tax td, where recall that fd = f ′d + td. Since
the revenues generated from td are spent on providing public goods, this will affect
aggregate variables. In the next section, we argue that the public good is in the
form of expenditure affecting the average ability of the workers hired. Moreover, the
expression (2.47) makes the channels, through which td payments affect equilibrium
outcomes, very explicit. They are important to appreciate changes in welfare. First,
there is a direct effect that makes per period survival of firms more difficult. Second,
there is an indirect effect that makes survival easier through an increase in the average
ability of the workers, through Γ (k(td)). Third, there are reallocation effects, which
influence productivity thresholds θd and, through them, average domestic profits, and
the intensive margin of trade. However, to learn what the effect of a change in fixed
costs is, we first have to embed the private sector into a framework with a government.
Before proceeding, we solve for a symmetric-countries case, which allows us to
clearly show the conflict of interest between exporters and non-exporters. This insight
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will prove useful in guiding us to the next section of comparative statics, and show
the mechanism behind the policy intervention by the government.
2.4 Symmetric-countries case
In this part, we solve for closed form solutions. We do this only for the expositional
purposes as this shows a clear mechanism when modifying the production tax td and
hence fixed costs fd. We obtain this by analysing the symmetric-countries case. We
will show the full derivations for the general case in the next section. As a result,
equation (2.36) becomes
A =
[(
zΓ− β
β
)
fe
]β
z c
β(1−γk)
δ bβγ
θβmin
(
Γ
βγ
φn
)ΓfΓd (fd + fxρz)−βz , (2.48)
where we used the fact that ρ = f
Γ
β
d
(
Υx
1−β
Γ −1
fx
)Γ
β
. Moreover, θd can be solved directly
from the equation (2.32) as follows:
θd =θmin
[(
zΓ− β
β
)
fe
]− 1
z
(fd + fxρz)
1
z
=θmin
[(
zΓ− β
β
)
fe
]− 1
z
fd + f z
Γ
β
d fx

(
1 + τ−
β
1−β
)
1−β
Γ − 1
fx

z Γ
β

1
z
, (2.49)
while
θx =θmin
[(
zΓ− β
β
)
fe
]− 1
z
f 1−z
Γ
β
d

(
1 + τ−
β
1−β
)
1−β
Γ − 1
fx

−z Γ
β
+ fx

1
z
. (2.50)
Further, for the symmetric-countries case, the explicit solution for M comes from the
following equation:
E =1 + βγΓ Mp¯i. (2.51)
Remark 1. The free entry condition generates a conflict in interest, embedded in the
cutoff productivity levels. Having the expressions only in parameters and fixed costs,
we can explore comparative statics of marginally changing td, where fd = f ′d + td.
Evidently, in this symmetric-country case ∂θd/∂td > 0, which makes it harder for
the domestic producer to survive, but ∂θx/∂td < 0, thereby increasing the share
of exporters. In the next section, we will notice that this also holds in a richer
environment, where the government, through its provision of public goods, affects the
surviving firms and the share of exporting firms.
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3 Comparative statics
In this section, we derive the main testable implications by comparing exporters and
domestic producers behaviour to changes in td. For this purpose, we focus on the
effects of fixed cost (of which one components is the production tax td) on the extensive
margin of trade and total expenditure in the differentiated sector. Having established
a conflict of interest over the choice of per-period fixed costs for enterprises, we can
introduce politico-economic setting, and explore what the effects of changing the level
of td are. This explains the rationale for the existence of a government. Notice that
the very existence of the government is motivated by the resource reallocation: from
charging firms for operating each period to making the hiring of more able workers
more profitable.
The introduction of the possibility to channel the revenues generated from pro-
duction taxes in terms of increased average ability creates additional effects. First,
the extensive margin reacts more strongly – hence, the economy, which invests the
collected fixed costs into education, tends to be more open. However, an increase in
the ability level also creates effects, which are amplified on other variables such as
expenditure. A decrease in expenditure tends to be larger in absolute value due to
both competition and education effects, which make survival for relatively inefficient
firms harder. The price increases, whereas the quantity drops by more, so that the
product decreases.
The main predictions of our model relate to the conflict of interest generated by the
fixed cost of production. Our approach differs from Do and Levchenko (2009), which
demonstrate that exporters, being larger firms, are more involved in lobbying activ-
ity, and may prefer business regulation, which adversely affect domestic producers.
They analyse the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic
institutions. They model fixed costs as a reflection of bad institutional framework.
They demonstrate that a more regulated and costly environment in the form of higher
fixed operating costs drives out relatively inefficient domestic producers. This harsher
environment makes the less productive firms more difficult to survive, while, on the
other hand, helps exporters (the more productive) to increase their profits.10 How-
ever, they do not channel the resources collected by the government back into the
economic system. In this paper, we do not link fixed costs and bad institutions a
priori. We, instead, hypothesise that the fixed costs could lead to either bad or good
institutions. That is, we do not assume that fixed costs are a pure loss in the system.
We introduce a channel through which part of the fixed costs could be reverted back
10For an exporter, a higher fixed cost has three effects. One, it lowers the total profits one-to-one
on the costs side. Second, a higher fixed cost increases profits because it implies fewer surviving firms.
This effects is larger the more productive the firm is. Third, higher costs imply fewer producers,
which lead to fewer varieties in the sector and, thus, a higher price level.
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to the economy in the form of public goods.11
3.1 Channels through cut-offs and the extensive margin of
trade
In this section, we embed the private sector equilibrium decisions into a framework,
where there exists a government who taxes the private sector and provides public
goods. We focus on the mechanism affecting productivity cut-offs and the extensive
margin of trade. Comparative statics on Q and A are shown in the Appendix as
they do not show relevant mechanism for the current purpose. We establish the
government budget constraint and the public goods technology. For this purpose,
we first build the channel, denominated wasteful. In this case, the government just
extracts resources from the private sector in the form of taxes, known as production
taxes td. The receipts from td are then wasted. One can think of this as a case when
policy makers (or their corresponding revenues officers) extract rents or receive money
from bribes but do not feedback these resources into the economic system. We also
model a second case, in which government receipts are used in providing public goods.
We model this as resources spent on education. Specifically, expenditure in education
is such that it positively affects workers’ ability. We call this the educational channel.
The government follows a balanced budget rule, where total revenues td [1−G(θd)]
equal total government expenditure G:
G =td [1−G(θd)] . (3.1)
The balancedness is assumed as our model is static, and can be thought of as the
steady state version of a dynamic extension.12 The running of deficits or surpluses
would require to complicate the model by introducing financial markets, and this is
not the aspect we want to emphasise or focus on.
We assume throughout that the ratio of the demand shifters (the aggregates A(td)
and A?(t?d)) entailed in Υx = 1 + τ
− β1−β
(
A?
A
) 1
1−β do not vary. This implicitly assumes
that the impact of the policy intervention (changes in td) on A in the home country is
similar in proportional terms to the impact of the corresponding policy intervention on
A? in the foreign country. This is because both A and A? change equiproportionally.
Note that a particular case for this is the symmetric-countries case (which is usually
assumed in the literature). We now start with the wasteful channel.
11There are many issues to be considered, such as commitment problem between a lobby and a
policy maker, as well as inside a lobby. See Magee (2002) on the modelling strategy to account for
the endogenous trade policy and lobby formation. We omit all these complications.
12See Helpman and Itskhoki (2009) for the extension of the basic trade and unemployment model
to the dynamic setting.
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3.1.1 The wasteful channel
Reconsider equation (2.29), which establishes the relative productivity cut-off require-
ment condition. This determines that
fx
fd
=
(
Υ
1−β
Γ
x − 1
) [
θx (θd (td))
(θd (td))
]β
Γ
, (3.2)
where the extensive margin of trade, ρ ≡ θd
θx
, is related to the fixed costs of production
and fixed cost of exporting, and to the intensive margin of trade. Note that, since
fd = f ′d + td, the extensive trade margin is a function of the production tax td. Now
take the derivative with respect to td. As a result, we obtain that:
β
Γθd,td (θx,θd − 1) =− fd,td = −
td
fd
. (3.3)
Given the parameter values from the consumer preferences and the technology side,
β,Γ > 0, the following cases exist:
θd,td =
< 0 if θx,θd>1,> 0 if 1>θx,θd . (3.4)
As can be noted, the revenues do not feedback positively to the system. That is, the
production tax increases without compensating the private sector directly through
the public provision of goods. This observation allows us establishing the following
lemma, which will be tested empirically.
Lemma 5. The extensive margin reacts positively to changes in the production tax
td.
Proof. Using the properties of elasticities, i.e., θx,θd =
θx,td
θd,td
, we obtain the elasticity
of the extensive margin of trade, ρ, with respect to the production tax, td, as follows:
ρ,td ≡ θd,td − θx,td =
Γ
β
· td
fd
. (3.5)
For the case when there is no feedback to the system, as the above lemma shows,
the proportion of exporting firms is increasing in the production tax. Moreover, the
marginal change in the extensive margin is constant, and equal to Γ/β. This, however,
does not determine, for a given productivity distribution, if the proportion of surviving
firms actually increases, that is, those firms above the productivity threshold θd. For
this purpose, we need to clarify the mechanism through which the conflict of interest
between domestic producers and exporters affects the extensive margin of trade.
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In order to obtain θd,td , consider the free entry condition.13 After implicitly dif-
ferentiating equation (2.32) with respect to td, noting that fe is a fixed sunk cost, we
obtain that:
zθd,td =
td
fd
+ fxρ
z
(fd + fxρz)
(
zρ,td −
td
fd
)
= td
fd
+
(
zΓ− β
β
)
fxρ
z
(fd + fxρz)
td
fd
>
td
fd
, (3.6)
since z Γ
β
> 1. This also implies that Γ
β
td
fd
> θd,td . Finally, using the fact that
θx,td
θd,td
= θx,θd , and employing equation (3.6) yield:
zθx,td =zθd,td − z
Γ
β
td
fd
=−
(
zΓ− β
β
)
td
fd
+
(
zΓ− β
β
)
fxρ
z
(fd + fxρz)
td
fd
< 0. (3.7)
As mentioned before, the free entry condition generates a conflict of interest, which is
embedded in the relative cut-off productivity levels (also refer to the Remark 1). As a
result of the above equations, there is a negative relationship between two productivity
cut-offs. Keeping sunk costs constant, any shock that affects an active domestic firm
in the economy must be offset by the effect of opposite sign on the exporting firm, and
vice versa. With this idea in mind, we now relate the mechanism behind the cut-off
productivity levels to the average operating profits. We can show explicitly how the
profits for the whole economy and the non-exporter get affected.
Taking the derivative of equation (2.33) with respect to td we obtain that
∂p¯i
∂td
=
∂z · Γ
β
· fe
∂td
= 0. (3.8)
Note that this is the result of the envelope theorem in which the derivative of the
average operating profit in the economy as a whole, p¯i, should be zero in the optimum.
Whereas the derivative of p¯id equation (2.34) with respect to td, yields:
∂p¯id
∂td
=−
(
zΓ− β
β
)
p¯ix
(fd + fxρz)
< 0, (3.9)
where we used the fact that ρ,td = Γβ
td
fd
, from the equation (3.5). Note that, since by
definition p¯id ≤ p¯i and that β < zΓ, the following holds:
∂p¯ix
∂td
= ∂p¯i
∂td
− ∂p¯id
∂td
> 0.
The above relations confirm the intuition regarding the conflict of interest between
exporters (the winners) and non-exporters (the losers). This is because a gain (loss)
13Recall that 1 > Γ > 0.
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in the average profit of a domestic producer must be compensated by a loss (gain) in
the average profit for the exporting firm to keep an average profit for all firms constant
(refer to the equation (2.33), which demonstrates that an average profit is just a fixed
proportion of sunk costs). The share of exporters and, therefore, the openness level
is affected, but the average active firm is left unchanged.
Further, using this explicit mechanism of conflict of interest, we can determine
what the effect on the total expenditure in the sector is. From the previous section,
we know that E is the weighted sum of operating profits for the whole economy and
non-exporters.14 Taking the derivative of E (from the equation (2.45)) with respect
to td allows us to establish the following testable proposition.
Proposition 1. Total expenditure E is decreasing in the production tax td. The effect
of td on expenditure is the average profit of exporters per unit of total costs adjusted
for the intensive margin of trade.
Proof. Partially differentiate equation for the equilibrium expenditure, leading to
∂E
∂td
=−
(
1−Υβ−1x
)(1 + βγ
Γ
)(
zΓ− β
β
)
p¯ix
(fd + fxρz)
< 0. (3.10)
This proposition establishes that by extracting resource from the private sector
in the form of production taxes td, the total expenditure in the differentiated sector
reduces. This negative effect stems from the fact that the price index P increased
(this can be clearly seen from the equation (2.46)). On the other hand, consumption
index, Q, must decrease. The decrease in the latter has to be more than proportional
to the increase in the former for the above proposition to hold (since E = PQ). Note
that this proposition clearly shows the dependence of E on the exporters’ profit. For
an exporter, a higher cost in the form of td has three effects. One, it lowers the total
profits one-to-one on the costs side. Second, a higher cost increases profits because it
implies fewer surviving firms (and less competition). This effects is larger the more
productive the firm is. Third, higher costs imply fewer producers, which lead to fewer
varieties in the sector and, thus, a higher price level. This can be seen more clearly
from the effect suffered by the counter part of the exporter, the domestic producer.
From the equation (2.31) we know that p¯id = fd
(
θmin
θd
)z (
1− ρz−βΓ
) (
zΓ
zΓ−β
)
, where the
first factor contains the first effect. The second factor is the probability of survival
(the second effect) and the third factor is the composition effect and its impact on
varieties.
We concentrate on aggregate expenditure as it can be mapped into an empirical
setting. However, it is of interest to explore how the general price index behaves, as
14This is further adjusted by a factor 1+βγ/Γ > 1, which is not affected in the current subsection
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it relates to the welfare in our economy. We demonstrate in the Appendix that the
equilibrium price can be expressed in two ways:
P = A
1
β
(
Γ
1+βγ
) 1−β
β
[
p¯id
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ p¯iΥβ−1x
]− 1−β
β
=
{
φ−1p c
−Γ+1−βγbγβθ−βd f
Γ
d
} 1
β
[
p¯id
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ p¯iΥβ−1x
]− 1−β
β .
The second equality considers prices as a function of sectoral variables, parameters,
technology, fd and a cut-off productivity θd. Combining all the channels, it turns out
that the effect on a general price index is related to the expenditure:
E,td = − q0Ω
(
ζ
1−ζ
)
· P,td
= −
(
ζ
1−ζ
) ϑ1−ϑP ζ1−ζ
ϑ
1−ϑP
ζ
1−ζ +1
 · P,td < 0,
where  denotes an elasticity. Therefore, an increase in production costs makes ex-
penditure suffer and the price index rise. This confirms the intuition about a reduction
in a welfare for the agents in the differentiated sector.
3.1.2 The educational channel
In this subsection, we proceed to analyse the effects of the government decision to
channel the receipts from taxing the private sector. We assume that these resources
are channelled back into the economic system, where in the previous subsection they
were just wasted outside the system. We consider the feedback of public resources
into the educational system. We choose this particular channel as it affects all the
modelled parts of the economy. Skill distribution is crucial for the labour market
outcomes, which feed into the structure of exporters. This, in turn, affects all the
aggregate measures, including the size of differentiated sector, prices, and general
welfare. A simple alternative would have been to model investment into (transport)
infrastructure, which is proxied, at least partly, by trade costs τ . As is demonstrated
in the Remark 2, it is a straightforward extension for which the rich model’s structure
is not needed.
Remark 2. Suppose government decides to channel funds into a better and more
efficient infrastructure, which reduces trade costs, τ . This is a standard exercise of
trade liberalisation. Consider the closed-form solution for the domestic productivity
cut-off, reported in (2.49). Obviously, moving from infinite trade costs (autarky)
or reducing any bounded level of trade costs increases the cut-off productivity level
(also see the export cut-off in (2.50)). This affects aggregate variables and labour
market only through the standard Melitz-type reallocations, where more firms afford
to engage in trade. The economy is better off and experiences gains from trade,
on the wasteful channel, whereas this factor will be affected in the next subsection.
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despite the nonlinearities of the model. However, the distribution of skills/abilities
is intact, and there is no channel from the labour market to trade, unlike our chosen
approach.
As a result, we look at the case, where td, as government expenditure on education,
affects positively workers’ ability. That is, an increase in td affects the shape parameter
k of the worker ability Pareto distribution Ga (a) = 1−(amin/a)k. It affects the average
ability directly through the sufficient statistic k,15 as the mean ability across workers
is k
k−1 · amin. Though it might seem intuitive to expect a necessarily positive effect,
however, it is quite unexpected after accounting for all the channels. To be more
precise, we assume an education technology as follows:
k (G) =c1 · G−ε
=c1 · {td [1−G(θd)]}−ε , ε, c1 > 0, (3.11)
where, as before, the government runs a balance budget, i.e., G = td [1−G(θd)] and c1
is a scaling factor.16 Recall that Γ (k(G)) ≡ 1− βγ − β (1−γk(G))
δ
– its marginal change
with respect to the production tax determines how variables of interest move. These
facts help establishing the following testable lemma.
Lemma 6. The extensive margin tends to react more strongly to changes in production
taxes, once the educational channel is allowed for.
Proof. Taking the derivative of equation (3.2) with respect to td and considering
Γ (k(G)) yield:
Bρ,td ≡ Bθd,td − Bθx,td =
Γ
β
td
fd
−D · Γ,td > 0, (3.12)
where D ≡ ln
(
Υ
( 1−ββ )Ψ
x /ρ
)
> 0, Ψ ≡ Υ
1−β
Γ
x /
(
Υ
1−β
Γ
x −1
)
> 0, td
fd
= fd,td , and Γ,td < 0,
provided z · Bθd,td < fd/td. The latter condition is sufficient (but not necessary) for
the positive sign.17 See the Appendix for the full derivation.
We use the superscript B to denote the educational channel. Note that Bρ,td > ρ,td
where ρ,td is from the equation (3.5).18 This is because of an additional educational
effect on ρ that arrives from the term −D · Γ,td > 0 for sufficiently bounded z · Bθd,td .19
15Consider that k is a sufficient statistic for both the mean and the variance since workers’ ability
is drawn from a Pareto distribution.
16Note that c1 ensures that k remains in the admissible parameter space.
17The elasticity of the domestic productivity threshold should be not too large, i.e., bounded by
z · Bθd,td < fdtd +
(Γ/β)2
D· γδ k·ε . Clearly, this condition is easier met for small td relative to fd.
18This also implies that, since z Γβ > 1, zBρ,td > zρ,td > fd,td =
td
fd
holds.
19Note that Γ,td = −βΓ γδ k ·ε
(
fd
td
− z · Bθd,td
)
td
fd
is itself a function of parameters, fd, td, and Bθd,td .
We do not explicitly solve Γ,td , as in this section we are solely interested in the signs of the derivatives.
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That is, among those firms that survive, the proportion of exporting firms increases
after an increase in the production taxes. The reason for this is rooted in the fact
that exporters, which have higher productivities, are benefiting relatively more from
the effects stemming from higher ability workers. Although all firms benefit from
the increase in ability, some of them do compensate the increase in td in terms of
both more production and higher prices. We again proceed to clarify the mechanism
through which a change in production taxes operates on the productivity thresholds
(refer to Figure 3.1, where elasticities for cases of wasteful and educational channels
have been simulated, with td approaching fd in 10 steps; refer to the Appendix and
online materials for technical details on simulations).
Figure 3.1: Elasticities of threshold productivities with and without
educational channel
In order to obtain θd,td , consider the free entry condition. Hence, implicitly dif-
ferentiate equation (2.32) with respect to td, recalling that fe is a fixed sunk cost,
obtaining:
zBθd,td =zθd,td −
(
fxρ
z
(fd + fxρz)
D + Γ(zΓ− β)
)
z · Γ,td > 0, (3.13)
provided that Γ,td < 0. It is worth noting that the last term entails the additional
educational channel (compared to zθd,td from the subsection on the wasteful channel).
Using the fact that
(
1− Bθx,θd
)
= Bρ,td/Bθd,td > 0 and equations (3.12) and (3.13), we
obtain that
zBθx,td =zθx,td −
(
−D + fxρ
z
(fd + fxρz)
D + Γ(zΓ− β)
)
z · Γ,td < 0, (3.14)
However, we analytically solve for Bθd,td in the Appendix. Importantly, Γ,td < 0⇐⇒ fdtd > z · Bθd,td .
Additionally, this condition is equivalent to the total government expenditure being increasing in td,
implying that we are on the increasing (left) side of the Laffer curve. This condition holds if and
only if fdtd > z · θd,td = 1 +
(
zΓ−β
β
)
fxρ
z
(fd+fxρz) > 1. As td is only a fraction of total fixed cost fd, in
principle this condition can hold. We consider the parameter values commonly used in the literature
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where the last term is a new element, compared to the subsection on the wasteful
channel, zθx,td .20
As mentioned in the subsection on the wasteful channel above, the conflict of
interest operates through the free entry condition. As before, there is a negative rela-
tionship between productivity cut-offs of domestic producer and exporters. However,
the educational channel generates an extra effect entailed in the last term of the above
equation. We now show explicitly how the profits are affected.
Taking the derivative of equation (2.33) with respect to td:
∂p¯iB
∂td
=
∂z · Γ
β
· fe
∂td
= p¯i
td
Γ,td < 0. (3.15)
Differently to the subsection on the wasteful channel, here the average operating profit
does decrease when td increases. On the other hand, the derivative of p¯id in equation
(2.34) with respect to td yields:
∂p¯iBd
∂td
=∂p¯id
∂td
+
(
p¯i − p¯ix − ∂p¯id
∂td
A · td
)
1
td
Γ,td < 0, (3.16)
where A > 0, and we used Bρ,td from the equation (3.12).21 Moreover, the first term,
which is negative, is from the subsection on the wasteful channel. The second term
is also negative as Γ,td < 0. Using the fact that p¯i = p¯id + p¯ix, and noting that, given
the properties of Υx > 1, and by definition p¯id ≤ p¯i, the following holds:22
∂p¯iBx
∂td
=∂p¯i
B
∂td
− ∂p¯i
B
d
∂td
> 0. (3.17)
This relation further confirms the findings from the subsection on the wasteful channel
above, in that it shows the conflict of interest between non-exporters and exporters
(the winners of this government policy). Now, in contrast, the average profit for all
firms does change (it decreases, as equation (3.15) shows). For this reason, the sign
of the marginal benefit for the exporter from the educational channel compared to
(see Section 8.6 in the Appendix and Helpman et al., 2008a). As a result, fdtd > z · θd,td ≈ 43 , which
implies that the production tax must be less than 75% of total fixed cost of production.
20Note that a sufficient condition for Bθx,td < 0 is the brackets to be negative:
Γ
(zΓ− β) <D −
fxρ
z
(fd + fxρz)
D = D fd(fd + fxρz) ,
which holds for the admissible parameter space in our theoretical model and those used in the
literature. See Helpman et al. (2008a) and Figure 8.1 in the Appendix which graphically confirms this.
21A ≡
(
β
zΓ−β
)
fd
td
[
zD − p¯ip¯ix ρz−
β
Γ βΓ (ln ρ+D)
]
> 0 as zD > ρz− βΓ βΓ (ln ρ+D). The last inequality
follows after using p¯ip¯ix and a few algebraical manipulations.22See Figure 8.2 in the Appendix for a graphical representation of the necessary and sufficient
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the wasteful channel (∂p¯iBx
∂td
− ∂p¯ix
∂td
) is not clear a priori. However, for the admissible
parameter space in our model and in related literature, the marginal benefit is positive
(see footnote 20). For this case, the loss in the average profit of a domestic producer is
more than compensated by the gain in the average profit for the exporting firm. This
is a result from a decreasing average profit for all firms. Another feature behind this
mechanism is the fact that the openness level (i.e., the share of exporters ρz) increases
more in the educational channel compared to the wasteful channel, i.e., Bρ,td > ρ,td .
The observation that E is the weighted average of profits of domestic producers
and exporters, and that the existence of the educational channel makes the conflict
of interest in the economy more acute, leads us to establish the following proposi-
tion. This proposition, as well as the corresponding one from the wasteful channel, is
testable, and we consider it in the empirical section below.
Proposition 2. The reaction of expenditure to a shock in the production taxes is
more pronounced when there is an educational channel. Its effect on expenditure, as
compared to a wasteful channel, is equal to −A · Γ,td > 0.
Proof.
∂EB
∂td
=∂E
∂td
(1−A · Γ,td) < 0, (3.18)
where ∂E
∂td
is from the equation (3.10) and A > 0.
Note that |∂EB
∂td
| > | ∂E
∂td
|, provided Γ,td < 0. That is, total expenditure in the
differentiated sector, E, is more sensitive when td is channelled through the education
expenditure into the ability of workers. This is because of the existence of an addi-
tional educational effect entailed in the term −A · Γ,td > 0. This term is larger the
larger the elasticity of the statistic k with respect to expenditure on education, ε. This
is because −Γ,td is increasing in ε. The rationale for this is that the conflict of interest
was intensified by the educational channel. To be more precise, the direct effect works
through the extensive margin, ρ. However, there is also an indirect channel working
through the intensive margin of trade. Notice that the interaction of the extensive
and intensive margins determines the effect on expenditure. The change in k affects
the power of an extensive margin (ρz−βΓ ), thereby creating another effect when the
very interaction (the functional form) of two margins changes.23 Figure 3.2 illustrates
how the production taxes affect total expenditure, with and without accounting for
the educational channel.
condition for ∂p¯i
B
x
∂td
> 0.
23In principle, however, the effect can be dampened by the educational channel if Γ,td > 0. This
happens when the production tax is relatively large to fd. We explore this case in simulations and
report results in the online Appendix. However, our preferred case is the one supported by data.
The values used for simulations and their sources can be found reported in the Appendix 9.
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Figure 3.2: Change in expenditure due to production tax
The main testable predictions of our model relate to the conflict of interest between
exporters and domestic producers. As noted before, an exporter benefits dispropor-
tionately from the higher fixed cost. This is because fewer surviving firms and, hence,
less competition increase profits (in terms of more production and higher prices). Re-
latively more firms drop out the market and the most productive firms make the most
out of this at the expenses of the low productivity firms. However, the increase in
output (from those firms that survive) does not compensate the fall in output from
those exiting the sector: total expenditure E decreases as a result.
4 Empirical Evidence
Having provided insight into the theoretical nexus of the openness and government’s
role through collecting and channelling production taxes, we aim at establishing em-
pirical support. First, notice that, unlike Do and Levchenko (2009), we do not impose
a priori an adverse relationship between fixed costs and institutional setting in the
economy. High per period costs could either proxy poor institutional environment
(ineffective judicial system, high expropriation risk, prohibitive cost of external fin-
ance) but could also be a sign of business conducive environment, where government
actively engages in channelling taxes to improve human capital, reduce frictions in
labour market or provide state-of-the-art public infrastructure. The differences in res-
ults once we use the traditional infrastructure variables (trade liberalisation) instead
of the educational channel, as emphasised by our theory, can be found in the online
Appendix.
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4.1 Data
We construct a data set, which covers the period from 1995 until 2011 in annual fig-
ures. The countries considered can be seen in Table 6.1. One of the main variables
in our theoretical model is the extensive margin of trade, ρ. Due to the country
level analysis, we self construct this variable from the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD), as otherwise the trade network would have been full if considered aggregat-
ively. Note that our model admits multi-sectoral analysis, and can be mapped to our
empirical strategy. The database covers 27 European Union countries and 13 other
major countries in the world. It indicates the use of products, either intermediate use
(domestic use and exports) or final use (domestic use and exports). It also indicates
the supply of products (imported or domestically produced). Moreover, the WIOD
database shows the country of origin and destination of products at the industry
level. It disaggregates the economy into 35 different industries with over 40 million
observations. This data give us time series of the extensive margin of trade for these
40 countries. We construct this variable as the ratio of all non-zero trade links and
all the possible trade links by the domestic industries with industries abroad. A link
is defined as non-zero (i.e., active) as long as a given industry exports to any other
foreign country.24 The total possible links by all domestic industries with foreign
market is 35 · 35 · 39, where 35 corresponds to the number of industries and 39 to all
the countries except for the domestic country. See Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) for the
construction of the world input-output tables.
The remaining variables are from the World Development Indicators from the
World Bank. We consider the intensive margin of trade Υx as a trade openness in-
dicator, which is defined as the ratio between trade flows and GDP. We use GDP as
a total expenditure in the sector. We use this variable as a proxy for E from the
theoretical model. In our theoretical economy, the production tax (td) constitutes the
only source of taxes, collected each period from active firms. Recall that we model
balanced government’s budget, summarised in equation (3.1). Therefore, we account
for the government’s expenditure using data on general government’s expenditure,
divided by the country’s GDP, to enable multi-country comparison. As for the in-
strumental variable approach, we instrument government expenditure with spending
on education (as a share of GDP) and adjusted savings on education (as a share of
GNI). Because of the availability of data, we end up with a panel covering 37 countries
with a total of 629 observations. For all the data and definitions of the variables see
Table 6.2 in the Appendix. The descriptive statistics for all the variables are shown
in Table 6.3.
24Note that we abstract from considerations relating to the size of firms as we do not have disag-
gregated data on the number of firms that export for multiple countries. That is to say, our data
cannot reflect the fact that a large number of small firms might not export, whereas a few large firms
might export.
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4.2 Estimation strategy
Our approach allows evaluating whether open economies behave as predicted by the
theory. We employ panel techniques to exploit variation both in spatial and time
dimensions. Our modelling strategy somewhat resembles that of trade gravity as de-
veloped by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Though our main variable of interest
is expenditure (and also trade extensive margin), gravity modellers are mainly inter-
ested in trade flows. They relate bilateral trade (which can be expressed as trade share
over GDP), to economic size of trade partners proxied by their GDPs, bilateral trade
barriers, and multilateral resistance variables. The latter, as popularised by Feenstra
(2004), are being modelled using fixed effects. They should capture the general equi-
librium (trade network) effects because any change in the bilateral trade flows create
an effect on the entire trade network. Therefore, instead of analysing trade values,
we can see our estimating equation as an ‘inverted’ gravity model: GDP becomes a
function of trade variables (intensive and extensive margins), multilateral and bilat-
eral terms (two-way fixed effects), and deterministic time effects to capture dynamics
of, say, technology improvements. To illustrate, the traditional gravity model pur-
ports that trade openness (the ratio between trade flow and GDP) is equal to the
trade costs, including bilateral and multilateral ones, and income shares of trading
partners. Recently, Helpman et al. (2008b) demonstrated that trade flows contain
substantial amount of zero values, and that the extensive margin of trade must be
accounted for even if one is solely interested in the trade intensity.
Figure 4.1: Government expenditure and GDP
Before continuing with our regression specification, we first show some graphic
evidence in Figure 4.1 for the relationship between total production taxes and total
expenditure. In that figure, we see a clear negative relation between our proxy for td
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and our proxy for E. This negative relationship is broadly consistent with the testable
implications of our theoretical model. We now proceed to establish whether this also
holds when we test it econometrically.
In our case, equation (2.45) can be rewritten, after taking logs and using expression
(2.36), as
lnE = ln ∆ + z
β
lnA+ ln
fd
(
1− ρz−βΓ
)
fd + fxρz
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ Υβ−1x

+ ln
f 1−z Γβd + fx
Υx 1−βΓ − 1
fx
z Γβ
 , (4.1)
where ∆ collects parameters and variables not responding to fixed costs.25 Hence,
expenditure is a non-linear function of td through fd (recall that fd = f ′d + td). Ex-
penditure is also a function of the extensive margin ρz, the intensive margin Υx, and
a demand shifter A. The latter is unobservable but can be proxied by a population
to reflect the size of the market. Since it is insignificant, we leave expressions with
population for robustness checks. The intensive margin is measured as a share of
trade over GDP and mimics a ratio of export revenue in total revenue, as shown in
the equation (2.13). To control for trade network effects, we will employ fixed effects
methodology.
We, therefore, test our prediction by first running regressions using government
expenditure as a proxy for total td payments. Total production tax payments could
be either considered as a loss – as is done in heterogeneous firms trade literature –
or channelled back into economy – as is done in this paper. Then we employ an in-
strumental variable (IV) approach, and explore the effect of the educational channel.
Technically, we use the overlapping variation of the total government’s expenditure
with that of spending on education. The larger the common variation, the more
consumption is channelled back through education. Specifically, we instrument the
government’s expenditure with spending on education (as a share of GDP) and adjus-
ted savings on education (as a share of GNI). In other words, we extract the variation
in total expenditure, which is contributable to education. This is done to be consist-
ent with the theory, which postulated that the latter part of government spending
(not all of it) matters for our described mechanisms to be at work. Proposition 2 pre-
dicts that the reaction in expenditure will be more pronounced and of negative sign
(compare equations (3.10) and (3.18)). We interpret the difference in two parameters
as the education effect on E, once channels of trade have been accounted for. We run
fixed effects panel regression, augmented with time effects to control for technology
25We let ln ∆ ≡ ln
(
1+βγ
β
)
zθzmin
( Γβγ φn)z
Γ
β(
c
(1−γk)
δ bγ
)z βzΓ−β ; note that for the wasteful channel this expres-
sions does not vary with td. However, for the educational channel, the last multiplicand does change.
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advancements and multilateral terms.
Facing data limitations, we cannot address all the surrounding issues of statistical
nature, namely testing for different channels, using larger set of conditioning variables,
and be fully confident of the validity of exclusion restrictions of the chosen variables.
The essence is to model the role of government’s expenditure on aggregate income.
The IVs should correlate with the government expenditure – and they obviously do
– but should not correlate with the residuals from the regression of government con-
sumption on aggregate income once excluded variables have been conditioned on.
Our model hints that if the educational channel is to be believed, this should be the
case. In other words, once we condition on trade margins, the proxy for td through
expenditure on education should capture the required variation. However, it would
be sensible to argue that, as economies get richer, they tend to spend more resource
in the education system. Thus, there could be reasons to consider the natural case of
an effect of GDP (aggregate income) on expenditure on education. As a result, one
can expect one category of government expenditure, namely education, to be correl-
ated with outcome variables. In other words, it seems reasonable to expect that the
exclusion restriction might be violated.26
Empirical studies have subjected Wagner’s law to various empirical tests. This
law states that there exists a positive long term relationship between income and
the relative size of the government.27 Interestingly, recent studies have subjected the
aforementioned law to more thorough empirical tests. A recent study by Bruckner
et al. (2012), using instrumental variable approach, has found that the elasticity of
government expenditures with respect to national income to be less than unity. How-
ever, among government expenditure subcategories like expenditure on education, the
results are different. Specifically, they estimate the income elasticity of government
expenditure on education to be small and not statistically different from zero (coeffi-
cient 0.32, standard errors 0.31). This empirical finding argues in favour of the validity
of the exclusion restriction, however, the usual caveats with respect to instrumental
variables should be considered.
Graphic evidence for the link between the extensive margin of trade and govern-
ment expenditure is presented in Figure 4.2. This visual inspection shows a clear
positive correlation between the extensive margin and total production taxes td (gov-
ernment expenditure). This relationship is broadly consistent with the testable im-
plications of the theoretical model. We now examine whether this relationship is
26We have also considered using the “outcome” variables such as a share of population with
advanced training, stock of human capital, etc. However, drawing from an endogenous growth theory,
we would face the same issue of instruments exogeneity. Rather, we proceed with the most direct
mapping from the theory to empirics.
27However, not much consensus with respect to aggregate government expenditure has been
achieved as to whether Wagner’s law holds in the data. It can be seen in Durevall and Henrekson
(2011) that there still exists controversy on the empirical findings.
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present when exposed to a more thorough empirical analysis.
To learn the effect on the extensive margin, we first recall that it can be expressed
as ρ = f
Γ
β
d
(
Υx
1−β
Γ −1
fx
)Γ
β
, or
ln ρ = Γ
β
ln fd +
Γ
β
ln
Υx 1−βΓ − 1
fx
 .
Therefore, the extensive margin is a function of fixed costs (of which one component
is td) and the intensive margin of trade. We test the implication whether, once
educational channel is allowed for, the effect on the extensive margin is positive and
larger (refer to Lemma 6). As mentioned in the data section above, we construct ρ
to uncover extensive margins. A positive difference between the coefficient on td of
the IV versus the OLS regressions would be interpreted as a positive effect stemming
from education.
Figure 4.2: Extensive margin and government expenditure
4.3 Results
The results of testing Proposition 1 are shown in Table 4.1. This shows the results
for the OLS estimator. We can see in column one the impact of a positive change in
government spending on expenditure. There we estimate a coefficient equal to −0.17,
which is statistically significant at the 1% level and consistent with our theory. We
also note that there is no direct effect of the extensive margin of trade on expenditure.
The second column shows a similar regression, but it additionally accounts for the
intensive margin of trade. In this case, the coefficient on government spending is also
negative and equal to −0.16 (statistically significant at the 1% level).
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Table 4.1: Expenditure (GDP) and the role of government
Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2)
SPENDING -0.174*** -0.168***
(0.042) (0.042)
EXTENSIV E 0.129 0.164
(0.135) (0.139)
INTENSIV E 0.040
(0.037)
N 618 618
R2 0.773 0.774
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
Table 4.2: Expenditure (GDP) and the role of government
Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING -0.387*** -0.434***
(0.118) (0.123)
EXTENSIV E 0.220 0.412** 0.181 0.353**
(0.151) (0.167) (0.153) (0.167)
INTENSIV E -0.051 -0.086**
(0.035) (0.039)
EDUCA 0.488*** 0.476***
(0.070) (0.070)
EDUCAnoK -0.202*** -0.198***
(0.058) (0.058)
Stock–Yogo F 64.91 63.57
Stock–Yogo F critical value 11.59 11.59
OID p–value 0.532 0.495
N 463 463 463 463
R2 0.363 0.366
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
Columns (2) and (4) are the 2nd stage regressions.
The Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for the weak instrument test are based
on the 2SLS size at 0.15 for the 5% level test for Excluded instruments.
OID= overidentification test of all instruments (Hansen J statistic).
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The results for the IV regression are shown in Table 4.2. Here we aim essentially at
testing whether the Proposition 2 holds in the data. We report the first stage regres-
sion results in columns 1 and 3, the latter being the case when the intensive margin
of trade is considered as a regressor. In those columns, we note that expenditure on
education is positively and statistically related to government spending (so relevance
condition is met, though will be tested more formally). Columns 2 and 4 show the
second stage regressions. There, we can note that the total production taxes (gov-
ernment spending) is negatively related to expenditure. This holds for both whether
we consider or not the intensive margin of trade as a regressor. The former has a
coefficient larger in absolute value. That is, the intensive margin of trade intensifies
the impact of fixed costs on expenditure. Moreover, the IV regressions tell us that
once we account for the effect of education, the impact of a change in government
spending increases in absolute value, from −0.16 to −0.43, where the latter is signi-
ficant at the 1% level. This confirms the existence of the educational channel and the
initial hypothesis that higher production taxes embedded in td might lead to quite
different results compared to the wasteful channel. We run the test for weak instru-
ment by Stock and Yogo (2005) and note that the F values are well above the critical
values.28 This does not cast doubt on the strength of our instruments. We conducted
Sargan-Hansen statistic of over-identifying restrictions and the null has never been
rejected indicating that instruments are valid (statistically exogenous, with no effect
on outcomes other than through the first stage channel).
Table 4.3: Extensive margin and the role of government
Ordinary Least Squares
(1) (2)
SPENDING 0.069*** 0.055***
(0.013) (0.013)
INTENSIV E -0.061***
(0.011)
N 618 618
R2 0.211 0.253
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
With regard to the results of the effects of production taxes on the extensive
margin, see Table 4.3. This collects evidence on the OLS case. It shows a positive
impact of government spending on the extensive margin of trade with a magnitude
of the coefficient of 0.055, which is significant at the 1% level. Table 4.4, instead,
shows the result on the instrumental variable approach. It confirms that, once the
educational channel is allowed for, the effect on the extensive margin is positive and
substantially larger (also refer to Lemma 6). The elasticity almost quadruples from
28See also Stock et al. (2002) for a related discussion.
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0.055 (from the OLS estimate) to 0.203, the latter being significant at the 1% level.
The difference between the OLS and the IV estimates is being interpreted as a positive
effect stemming from education. We also test for the strength of the instruments and
again F values are well above the critical values by Stock and Yogo (2005). However,
the OID test does reject the null, which casts some doubt over the validity of the
instruments and calls for caution when interpreting this set of results.
Table 4.4: Extensive margin and the role of government
Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING 0.227*** 0.203***
(0.039) (0.040)
INTENSIV E -0.058* -0.031**
(0.034) (0.014)
EDUCA 0.495*** 0.480***
(0.070) (0.070)
EDUCAnoK -0.192*** -0.190***
(0.058) (0.058)
Stock–Yogo F 77.62 76.56
Stock–Yogo F critical value 11.59 11.59
OID p–value 0.00 0.00
N 463 463 463 463
R2 0.359 0.364
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
Columns (2) and (4) are the 2nd stage regressions.
The Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for the weak instrument test are based
on the 2SLS size at 0.15 for the 5% level test for Excluded instruments.
OID= overidentification test of all instruments (Hansen J statistic).
Further, we run some robustness checks (refer to the Appendix for the relevant
tables). We first start by dropping one country each at a time. We do this for both
the OLS and IV cases. The country we drop corresponds to the column’s number
(see Table (6.1)). We start with the OLS case with corresponding Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
There we note that the coefficients on SPENDING range from a lowest of 0.045
(dropping Romania or Turkey) to a largest of 0.63 (dropping Hungary). The vast
majority of these coefficient are statistically significant at the 1% level. Recall that
for the benchmark case, where all countries are considered, this value is 0.055. On
the other hand, the coefficient on INTENSIV E for the benchmark case was −0.061.
When dropping one country each at a time, this coefficient ranges from a lowest of
−0.069 (dropping Canada) to a largest of −0.042 (dropping India), and are statist-
ically significant at the 5% level. We continue with the IV case with corresponding
Tables 7.3 and 7.4. They report the second stage regressions. For the benchmark
case (all countries), we had a coefficient on SPENDING of 0.203. When dropping
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one country each at a time, this coefficient ranges from a minimum of 0.133 (drop-
ping Indonesia) to a maximum of 0.228, when we drop Latvia. For the coefficient on
INTENSIV E we had value of −0.031 in our benchmark estimation. When dropping
one country each at a time, the coefficient on INTENSIV E ranges from a minimum
of −0.040 (dropping Canada) to a maximum value of −0.018, when dropping India.
Given these results, we can only conclude that there is some consistency of the coef-
ficient on the variable INTENSIV E across estimators as those countries, which are
dropped, make this coefficient the lowest (Canada) and the highest (India) for both
the OLS and the IV estimators. With respect to the test of overidentifying restrictions
(not presented in the tables), we reject the null hypothesis, which casts some doubt
on the validity of the instruments. However, for the weak instrument by Stock and
Yogo (2005) (not presented in the tables), the F values are well above the critical
values and, hence, does not cast doubt on the strength of our instruments.
We also analyse the effect of splitting the sample into two subsets. One sub-
set, where countries have an extensive margin (average across time) larger than the
median, and those, which are below the median. We run the regressions relating
expenditure to production taxes and other regressors. We show these in Tables 7.6
and 7.5. Table 7.6 shows the OLS estimates. There it can be noted that for those
countries, which are below the median extensive margin, ρ, (see column 1), the effect
of government spending on expenditure is negative (−0.057), as in the benchmark
case, but smaller in absolute value than for those countries, which are above the me-
dian (column 2), where the coefficient is now −0.382. The former coefficient being
statistically undistinguishable from zero, whereas the latter being significant at the
1% level. When instrumenting government spending, we see in the second column
of Table 7.5 that those countries below the median ρ now have a larger (in absolute
terms) coefficient on spending (−0.582), compared to those countries, which are above
the median extensive margin of trade (-0.368) in column 4, where both coefficients are
significant at conventional levels. A number of further robustness checks can be also
found in the accompanying online Appendix. It is worthwhile mentioning that using
a number of infrastructure components, we could not establish consistent evidence of
the educational channel, attributable to other (more trade related) variables.
5 Conclusion
International trade literature has enjoyed a revival after an introduction of firm het-
erogeneity into a monopolistic competition model with the love of variety. However, it
is only recently that more interest has been documented with regard to the fixed costs,
which produce firm partitioning into exporters and non-exporters. This enables to
uncover new gains from trade, selection effects, when less productive firms are driven
out from the open economy by more productive ones.
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A few contributions, which analysed fixed costs, mainly focused on their determin-
ation and treated them as either payments to policy makers or a pure loss. Motivated
by the empirical fact that higher business operation costs can be related to both lar-
ger and smaller government sector, we introduce fiscal policy into the model due to
Helpman et al. (2010). Instead of a simple trade liberalisation idea when taxes are re-
verted back to the economy through decreased trade costs, we propose an educational
channel, which is contrasted to the standard result when fixed costs are treated as a
pure loss. Contributing to literatures on the political economy and trade, and trade
and labour markets outcomes, we demonstrate that fixed costs, and particularly one
of its components, the production tax, paid by all active firms and redistributed back
through the educational channel, change the structure of active firms and, thus, affect
the entire macroeconomy. The ability level of the workforce increases and this helps to
make a country more open than without such a channel. We, therefore, contribute to
the emerging literature on the importance of the skill distribution on trade patterns.
However, aggregate expenditure level drops and prices increase, therefore, reducing
general welfare. Three major effects for the trading firm include a drop in the profit
due to payments in terms of a fixed cost, an increase in the profit due to lesser meas-
ure of remaining competitors, and, lastly, lower measure of available varieties and,
consequently, higher price.
We also mapped our theoretical framework to test the predictions on the extensive
margin and expenditure using a dataset on 40 countries from 1995-2011. Employing
education variables (expenditure and savings) to instrument for the aggregate gov-
ernment expenditure, we find our predictions largely confirmed. Of course, it would
be desirable to have richer data to explore the robustness of our results. In particular,
we see our framework to be tested using micro level data, and certified, whether the
variation across the countries mimics the behaviour within a country. Both theoret-
ically and empirically, it remains unexplored how adjustments in the differentiated
sector are being transmitted to the homogeneous sector. In a static environment with
the fixed aggregate income, any change in one sector causes adjustments in the other
one. Treating homogeneous sector as an informal economy opens new vistas to ex-
plore how government intervention affects economy’s openness, sectoral shifts, relative
share of exporters to non-exporters, and formality. Another area worth exploring is
the creation of a political economy model that fully endogenises the determination of
production taxes td. This framework could provide additional insights into how the
government optimally sets the equilibrium level of production taxes in a game, where
net profits of both exporters and non-exporters are being considered. A research on
the educational channel and the comparative advantage at a sectoral level, which
helps to account for varying degrees of complementarity, can be pursued along the
lines of Bombardini et al. (2012). These are exciting avenues for future research.
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Appendices
6 Data
6.1 List of countries
Table 6.1: List of countries
Country Nr. Country Nr. Country Nr.
Australia 1 Greece 14 Poland 27
Austria 2 Hungary 15 Portugal 28
Brazil 3 India 16 Romania 29
Bulgaria 4 Indonesia 17 Russia 30
Canada 5 Ireland 18 Slovak Republic 31
China 6 Italy 19 Slovenia 32
Cyprus 7 Japan 20 Spain 33
Czech Republic 8 Korea 21 Sweden 34
Denmark 9 Latvia 22 Turkey 35
Estonia 10 Lithuania 23 United Kingdom 36
Finland 11 Malta 24 United States 37
France 12 Mexico 25
Germany 13 Netherlands 26
6.2 Data description and source
Table 6.2: Variables and sources
Variable Sources and description
SPENDING
Natural logarithm (henceforth, ln) of general government final consumption
expenditure (% of GDP, NE.CON.GOVT.ZS) by WDI, the World Bank.
EXTENSIV E (ρ)
Ratio of all non-zero trade links and all the possible trade links by domestic
industries with industries abroad. The database covers 40 countries from 1995
to 2011 and 35 different industries. Self constructed with data from WIOD.
See Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) and http://www.wiod.org.
INTENSIV E (Υx) Ln of export plus imports (% of GDP, NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS) by WDI.
EDUCA
Ln of public spending on education, total (% of GDP, SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS),
WDI.
EDUCAnoK Ln of current education expenditure (% of GNI, NY.ADJ.AEDU.GN.ZS), WDI.
Population Population total ( SP.POP.TOTL), WDI.
GDP
Ln of GDP, PPP (constant 2005 international $, NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD),
WDI. We use this variable as a proxy for E from the theoretical model.
doing business
Costs of doing-business and legal procedures (% of GNI per capita,
IC.REG.COST.PC.ZS), Doing Business, World Bank.
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics
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Table 6.3: Descriptive Statisticsa
mean min max sd cv
GDP 26.57 22.71 30.21 1.65 0.06
SPENDING -1.70 -2.71 -1.21 0.27 -0.16
EXTENSIV E -0.15 -0.72 -0.04 0.14 -0.94
INTENSIV E 4.30 2.76 5.21 0.54 0.12
EDUCA 1.56 0.00 2.17 0.28 0.18
EDUCnoK 1.51 -0.57 2.11 0.32 0.21
a) All countries from Table 6.1 pooled together.
cv= coefficient of variation.
6.3 Data evidence
As stated in the main text, empirically, we find examples when high taxes and, there-
fore, high government consumption correlate with worse institutions (as proxied by
high doing-business costs).29 Bulgaria is a prominent example. Figure 6.1 (left pane)
demonstrates exactly such a pattern: though higher regulation and doing-business
costs are associated with higher government’s consumption (which must be financed
from taxes), there are also counter examples, as mentioned. The positive association
is in line with previous research. However, the right pane shows the example of the
Netherlands, which demonstrates that high government consumption can be asso-
ciated with high quality institutions (as proxied by low doing-business costs). We,
therefore, see our contribution as proposing a channel, which could explain such a
diverging phenomenon among a set of trading and, as a result, interdependent eco-
nomies.
29Doing-business costs are costs of running a company and legal procedures. Data are from Doing
Business Report, World Bank. See the Appendix.
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Figure 6.1: Heterogeneity in government expenditure and doing-business
costs
7 Robustness Checks
7.1 Dropping one country each at a time
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Table 7.1: Extensive margin and the role of government
Dropping country (Block 1)
Ordinary least squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SPENDING 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.051***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
INTENSIV E -0.064** -0.060** -0.063** -0.063** -0.069** -0.066** -0.064** -0.060** -0.060** -0.063**
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
N 601 601 601 601 601 601 602 601 601 601
R2 0.260 0.254 0.254 0.262 0.264 0.252 0.256 0.257 0.255 0.256
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
SPENDING 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.058***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
INTENSIV E -0.061** -0.061** -0.061** -0.060** -0.060** -0.042* -0.057* -0.057** -0.061** -0.060**
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
N 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601
R2 0.246 0.258 0.253 0.245 0.257 0.275 0.222 0.237 0.259 0.257
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
The country excluded corresponds to column’s number (see Table 6.1).
..
Table 7.2: Extensive margin and the role of government
Dropping country (Block 2)
Ordinary least squares
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
SPENDING 0.050** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.045* 0.056***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.018)
INTENSIV E -0.066** -0.063** -0.060** -0.047* -0.064** -0.061** -0.063** -0.062** -0.063** -0.062**
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
N 601 601 601 601 601 601 602 601 601 610
R2 0.247 0.258 0.246 0.229 0.258 0.261 0.252 0.263 0.229 0.251
(31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37)
SPENDING 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.059*** 0.057***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
INTENSIV E -0.060** -0.060** -0.061** -0.061** -0.050* -0.063** -0.061**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027)
N 601 601 601 601 601 601 601
R2 0.254 0.257 0.260 0.260 0.241 0.268 0.258
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
The country excluded corresponds to column’s number (see Table 6.1).
.Table 7.3: Extensive margin and the role of government
Dropping country (Block 1)
Instrumental variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SPENDING 0.201*** 0.205*** 0.199*** 0.205*** 0.190*** 0.201*** 0.218*** 0.195*** 0.203*** 0.222***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.049)
INTENSIV E -0.032** -0.031** -0.034** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.031** -0.034** -0.031** -0.030** -0.026*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
N 454 448 450 450 451 459 450 448 449 448
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
SPENDING 0.207*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.208*** 0.221*** 0.133*** 0.214*** 0.199*** 0.210***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.035) (0.043) (0.040) (0.042)
INTENSIV E -0.031** -0.030** -0.032** -0.030** -0.030** -0.018 -0.035*** -0.023* -0.033** -0.027*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
N 449 448 455 455 448 452 450 448 448 449
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. The country excluded corresponds to column’s number (see Table 6.1).
The Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument test and the overidentification test are not reported here but commented in the main text.
.Table 7.4: Extensive margin and the role of government
Dropping country (Block 2)
Instrumental variables
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
SPENDING 0.198*** 0.228*** 0.223*** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.199*** 0.204*** 0.193*** 0.218*** 0.203***
(0.043) (0.047) (0.043) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.043) (0.041)
INTENSIV E -0.032** -0.028* -0.026* -0.029** -0.034** -0.032** -0.035** -0.035*** -0.032** -0.032**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
N 451 449 449 456 449 447 448 449 454 458
(31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37)
SPENDING 0.216*** 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.198*** 0.173*** 0.223*** 0.205***
(0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.043) (0.041)
INTENSIV E -0.031** -0.031** -0.033** -0.031** -0.029** -0.033** -0.030**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
N 448 452 448 448 455 448 450
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. The country excluded corresponds to column’s number (see Table 6.1).
The Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument test and the overidentification test are not reported here but commented in the main text.
7.2 Median split (by the extensive margin)
.
Table 7.5: Expenditure (GDP) and the role of government
Instrumental Variables
By extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPENDING -0.582*** -0.368**
(0.198) (0.151)
EXTENSIV E 0.406* 0.145 -0.313 0.973*
(0.210) (0.257) (0.519) (0.508)
INTENSIV E -0.037 -0.000 -0.068* -0.180***
(0.061) (0.070) (0.039) (0.040)
EDUCA 0.467*** 0.487***
(0.113) (0.088)
EDUCAnoK -0.190** -0.205**
(0.089) (0.083)
Stock–Yogo F 25.046 39.956
Stock–Yogo F critical value 11.59 11.59
OID p–value 0.6455 0.9988
N 211 211 252 252
R2 0.400 0.408
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) include countries with ρ below (above) median.
Columns 2 and 4 are the 2nd stage regressions.
The Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for the weak instrument test are based
on the 2SLS size at 0.15 for the 5% level test for Excluded instruments.
OID= overidentification test of all instruments (Hansen J statistic).
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Table 7.6: Expenditure (GDP) and the role of government
Ordinary Least Squares
By extensive margin
(1) (2)
SPENDING -0.057 -0.382***
(0.058) (0.046)
EXTENSIV E -0.318* 1.120**
(0.173) (0.525)
INTENSIV E 0.172*** -0.209***
(0.050) (0.040)
N 313 305
R2 0.811 0.856
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.
Column 1 (2) includes countries with ρ below (above) median.
8 Theoretical model
8.1 Setting
The real consumption index for the sector (Q) is defined as follows:
Q =
[ˆ
j∈J
q (j)β dj
] 1
β
, ζ < β < 1, (8.1)
where j indexes varieties; J is the set of varieties within the sector; q (j) denotes
consumption of variety j; and β governs the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Moreover, the price index for the differentiated sector (P ), which is dual to Q, is
P =
[ˆ
j∈J
p (j)−
β
1−β dj
]− 1−β
β
. (8.2)
As is reported in the main text (see equation (2.8)), the demand function for
homogenous good is given by
q0 =
(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
QP
1
1−ζ .
Moreover, combining equations (2.7) for j and j′ yields q (j) = q (j′)
(
p(j)
p(j′)
) 1
β−1 ∀j 6= j′.
After integrating over all varieties j ∈ J and manipulating it, we obtain the CES
demand curved for variety j′ as a function of sector aggregates (P , Q) and its own
price p(j′):
q (j′) =p(j′)−
1
1−βQP
1
1−β =
(
A
p (j′)
) 1
1−β
∀j′ ∈ J, (8.3)
where A ≡ E1−βP β = Q1−βP is a demand-shifter for the sector.
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Substituting equations (2.8) and (8.3) in the budget constraint, and using
´
j∈J p(j)
− β1−β dj =
P−
β
1−β yield the optimal real consumption index of the differentiated sector,
Q =Ω
[(
ϑ
1− ϑ
)
P
1
1−ζ + P
]−1
, (8.4)
and the demand-shifter for that same sector
A
1
1−β ≡ EP β1−β =Ω
[(
ϑ
1− ϑ
)
P
ζ−β
(1−ζ)(1−β) + P−
β
1−β
]−1
, (8.5)
both as functions of aggregate income Ω and sectoral prices.
8.1.1 Details of labour market
Worker ability is assumed to be independently distributed and drawn from a Pareto
distribution with a shape parameter k, such that Ga (a) = 1−
(
amin
a
)k
for a ≥ amin > 0
and k > 1. After a firm pays a search cost of bn units of the numeraire (to be specified
when dealing with the equilibrium), it is randomly matched with a measure of n
workers. The search cost b per unit of matching workers is endogenously determined in
the labour market. The labour market tightness and its characteristics are essentially
based on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides approach. For simplicity, we assume
that after paying a screening cost of caδc
δ
, where c > 0 and δ > 0, a firm can determine
which workers have an ability above ac, where ac > amin, which guarantees an interior
equilibrium. Then, a firm only hires workers with abilities larger than ac. By doing
so, a firm reduces its output by decreasing workers hired, h. On the other hand, a
firm raises output (thus revenue and profits increase) by increasing the average ability
of the workers a¯. Therefore, a firm, choosing ac, hires a measure h = n
(
amin
ac
)k
of
workers who have an average ability a¯ = k
k−1ac. As a result, the output of each variety
can be rewritten as
y = κyθnγa1−γkc , (8.6)
where κy ≡ kk−1 (amin)γk .
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8.2 Equilibrium
p¯i =
ˆ ∞
θd
Γ
1 + βγ
(
Γ
1 + βγ
)−1
Υ (θ)
1−β
Γ fd
(
θ
θd
)β
Γ
gθ (θ) dθ
=z · θzminfd
( 1
θd
)β
Γ
{ˆ ∞
θd
Υ (θ)
(1−β)
Γ θ
β
Γ−z−1dθ
}
=z · θzminfd
( 1
θd
)β
Γ
{ˆ θx
θd
Υ (θ)
(1−β)
Γ θ
β
Γ−z−1dθ +
ˆ ∞
θx
Υ (θ)
(1−β)
Γ θ
β
Γ−z−1dθ
}
=z · θzminfd
( 1
θd
)β
Γ
{ˆ θx
θd
θ
β
Γ−z−1dθ + Υx
1−β
Γ
ˆ ∞
θx
θ
β
Γ−z−1dθ
}
=z · θzminfd
( 1
θd
)β
Γ
{
1
β
Γ − z
(
θ
β
Γ−z
x − θ
β
Γ−z
d
)
+ Υx
1−β
Γ
1
β
Γ − z
(
lim
θ→∞
θ
β
Γ−z − θ
β
Γ−z
x
)}
=z · θzminfd
( 1
θd
)β
Γ 1
z − βΓ
[
θ
β
Γ−z
d +
(
Υx
1−β
Γ − 1
)
θ
β
Γ−z
x
]
=fd
(
θmin
θd
)z 1 + (fd
fx
) zΓ−β
β (
Υx
1−β
Γ − 1
)z Γ
β
 zΓ
zΓ− β > 0.
=
(
θmin
θd
)z
(fd + fxρz)
(
zΓ
zΓ− β
)
> 0. (8.7)
The second line follows from noting that aggregates are functions of θd and not θ,
hence, we can factor the elements, which are functions of θ in the integral. The fourth
line follows the same logic as well as from using the fact that
´ θx
θd
Ix (θ) = 0, which
implies Υ (θ) = 1 for this range, and that
´∞
θx
Ix (θ) = 1, which implies Υ (θ) = Υx for
this range. The sixth line follows from imposing βΓ − z < 0 in order for the integral to
be well defined. The seventh line uses (2.29), where ρ = f
Γ
β
d
(
Υx
1−β
Γ −1
fx
)Γ
β
. Similarly,
the average operating profit for the non-exporter, p¯id ≡
´ θx
θd
Γ
1+βγ r (θ) gθ (θ) dθ, can be
also re-expressed as:
p¯id =fd
(
θmin
θd
)z 1− (fd
fx
) zΓ−β
β (
Υx
1−β
Γ − 1
) zΓ−β
β
( zΓ
zΓ− β
)
> 0,
=
(
θmin
θd
)z fd − f zΓβd
Υx 1−βΓ − 1
fx
 zΓβ Υx 1−βΓ − 1
fx
−1
( zΓ
zΓ− β
)
=
(
θmin
θd
)z (
fd + fxρz
1
1−Υx 1−βΓ
)(
zΓ
zΓ− β
)
=
(
θmin
θd
)z
fd
(
1− ρz−βΓ
)( zΓ
zΓ− β
)
> 0, (8.8)
where the procedure to obtain this follows the same logic used in obtaining p¯i but for
the range θ ∈ [θd, θx). Using p¯i from the equation (2.30), we re-express the free entry
condition as:
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fe =p¯i − fd [1−G(θd)]− fx [1−G(θx)]
=
(
θmin
θd
)z
(fd + fxρz)
(
zΓ
zΓ− β
)
− fd
(
θmin
θd
)z
− fx
(
θmin
θx
)z
=
(
θmin
θd
)z [
(fd + fxρz)
(
zΓ
zΓ− β
)
− fd − fxρz
]
=
(
θmin
θd
)z
(fd + fxρz)
(
β
zΓ− β
)
, (8.9)
where we used [1−G(θd)] =
(
θmin
θd
)z
and [1−G(θx)] =
(
θmin
θx
)z
from the Pareto
distribution.
8.2.1 Computing the price index (P, P ?) , the real consumption index
(Q, Q?) , the mass of firms (M, M?) , and the size of the labour force
(L, L?)
Substitute equation (2.41) in the price index, equation (2.43). Consider then all
active firms in the economy, which actually produce, i.e., those with θ ≥ θd. Recalling
that firms draw their productivity from the cumulative distribution Gθ (θ) = 1 −(
θmin
θ
)z
, hence, the probability density function is gθ(θ) = zθzminθ−z−1. As a result,
the equilibrium price index is the following:
P =
{
A−
β
1−βA−1
(
1 + βγ
Γ
)
fdθ
−βΓ
d
ˆ ∞
θd
Υ (θ)
1−β
Γ (1−Γ) θ
β
Γ gθ(θ)dθ
}− 1−β
β
=A
1
β
(
Γ
1 + βγ
) 1−β
β
{
θ
−βΓ
d fdθ
z
minz
[ˆ θx
θd
θ
β
Γ−z−1dθ + Υ
1−β
Γ (1−Γ)
x
ˆ ∞
θx
θ
β
Γ−z−1dθ
]}− 1−β
β
=A
1
β
(
Γ
1 + βγ
) 1−β
β
p¯id + Υβ−1x
(
zΓ
zΓ− β
)(
θmin
θd
)z fd − fd + fxρz
Υ
1−β
Γ
x − 1 + 1
Υx
1−β
Γ − 1



− 1−β
β
=A
1
β
(
Γ
1 + βγ
) 1−β
β
{
p¯id + Υβ−1x
(
zΓ
zΓ− β
)(
θmin
θd
)z [
fd + fxρz + fd
(
−1 + ρzρ−βΓ
)]}− 1−ββ
=A
1
β
(
Γ
1 + βγ
) 1−β
β [
p¯id
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ p¯iΥβ−1x
]− 1−β
β . (8.10)
Recall that z− βΓ > 0 must hold in order for p¯i to be well defined (see equation (8.7)).
From the equation (2.41), we split f 1−Γd into f−Γd and fd, where the former was used to
re-express in terms of A−1. Finally, using equations (2.31) and (2.30), we obtained P
as a function of A
1
β , and a weighted average of operating profit for the whole economy
and the non-exporters.
We can, alternatively, express the price level as a function of sectoral variables,
parameters, technology, fd and θd. Then P is as follows:
P =
{
φ−1p c
−Γ+1−βγbγβθ−βd f
Γ
d
} 1
β
[
p¯id
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ p¯iΥβ−1x
]− 1−β
β . (8.11)
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Note also that 1−βγ−Γ
β
= 1−γk
δ
> 0 and 1−β−Γ = β
δ
[1− δ + γ (δ − k)] = β
δ
[1− γk − δ (1− γ)] Q
0, recalling that 1 > γk > 0 for a firm to have an incentive to screen. Now look at
the exponent of fd, which has that sign. Hence, looking at (2.24), one can notice that
y is increasing in fd, and thus p must be decreasing in fd. As P is like a weighted
average of the variety prices p, P must also be decreasing in fd, which then means
that 1 − β − Γ > 0 must hold. Furthermore, P is increasing in A (for a given A∗)
since Υx
1−β
Γ (1−Γ) is decreasing in A (for a given A∗), where 1−βΓ (1− Γ) > 0 (since
1 > Γ > 0).
8.3 Symmetric-countries case
.The symmetric-countries case implies that Υx = 1 + τ−
β
1−β . Hence the Price level
for the differentiated sector can be expressed as the various costs and technology, and
parameters.
P =
 c
β(1−γk)
δ bβγ
θβmin
(
Γ
βγ
φn
)ΓfΓd (fd + fxρz)−βz
(
zΓ− β
β
)β
z
f
β
z
e

1
β (
Γ
1 + βγ
) 1−β
β
(
zΓ
β
· fe
)− 1−β
β
·
fd
(
1− ρz−βΓ
)
fd + fxρz
(
1−Υβ−1x
)
+ Υβ−1x
−
1−β
β
=c
(1−γk)
δ bγ
θmin
Γ−
Γ
β β
Γ−β
β
− 1
z γ−γ
k − 1
k
a−γkmin (1− γk)−
(1−γk)
δ (1 + βγ) fΓ
1
β
− 1−β
β
d ·
(fd + fxρz)−
1
z
+ 1−β
β (zΓ− β) 1z f
1
z
− 1−β
β
e z
− 1−β
β
[
1 +
(
Υx
1−β
Γ (1−Γ) − 1
)
ρz−
β
Γ
]− 1−β
β
(8.12)
8.4 Comparative statics on aggregate prices and quantities
In this section, we analyse how the changes in the composition of firms in the differ-
entiated sector affect the sectorial aggregate variables. These variables are the ideal
price index P , its dual bundle Q, and the demand shifter A. We build on the previous
section in order to sign some of the expressions to follows. Since we employ sectoral
data to infer variation in the extensive margin of trade, our modelling framework
incorporates two sectors, differentiated and homogenous. However, this introduced
additional complexities. One difference compared to the one-sector model is that Q−1
and P are not substitutable one-to-one. In other words, the elasticity between ag-
gregate price index and consumption basket in the differentiated sector is not one in
absolute terms. Let us see if this is true given that we know from equation (8.4) that
Q = Ω
[(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
P
1
1−ζ + P
]−1
. As a result
d lnQ
d lnP ≡ Q,P =−
1
1− ζ ≤ −
1
1− ζ +
ζ
1− ζ
PQ
Ω ≤ −1. (8.13)
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Note that when ϑ = 0 (no homogeneous sector) then P = P (or equivalently PQ = Ω)
implying Q,P = −1. On the other hand, the elasticity of demand shifter, A, with
respect to the price level P is as follows:
A,P ≡d lnA
d lnP = (1− β)
d lnQ
d lnP + 1
=(1− β)
(
− 11− ζ +
ζ
1− ζ
PQ
Ω
)
+ 1
=β
1− ζ
ζ − 1
ϑ
ϑ+ (1− ϑ)P− ζ1−ζ
+ ζ
ζ − 1
ϑ
ϑ+ (1− ϑ)P− ζ1−ζ
=B > 0, (8.14)
where we let B ≡ β
[
1− ζ
ζ−1
ϑ
ϑ+(1−ϑ)P−
ζ
1−ζ
]
+ ζ
ζ−1
ϑ
ϑ+(1−ϑ)P−
ζ
1−ζ
and note that β−ζ1−ζ ≤
B ≤ β. The first inequality follows from noting 0 < ζ < β. Knowing how E is affected
by the government policy, we can also analyse the effects on the price level in an
indirect manner. Hence, consider the fact that E = PQ = Ω
[(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
P
1
1−ζ + P
]−1
P.
Note that this expression allows us to divide the effect of varying td into its two parts:
the effect on quantitative Q and the effect on the ideal price index P . We obtain the
latter by differentiating this expression E with respect to td. As a result, we obtain
that:
E,td =−
q0
Ω
(
ζ
1− ζ
)
· P,td
=−
(
ζ
1− ζ
) ϑ1−ϑP ζ1−ζ
ϑ
1−ϑP
ζ
1−ζ + 1
 · P,td < 0, (8.15)
where the sign follows from either the wasteful or the educational channels from
equations (3.10) and (3.18), respectively. Note that for both cases the sign is negative.
Given the range of the parameters ϑ and ζ, we can conclude that the effect of td on
the price level P is positive:
P,td >0. (8.16)
The decrease in E can be understood more clearly given that Q moves in the opposite
direction to P , and does it more than equiproportionally (see equation (8.13)).
Moreover, since A,θd can be decomposed as follows:
A,θd =A,P P,θd = BP,θd > 0. (8.17)
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8.5 Analytical solutions for the comparative statics on θd and
θx
In this subsection we solve analytical solutions for the effects on the productivity
thresholds from the subsection on the educational channel.
Take the derivative of equation (3.2) with respect to td, yielding
Bρ,td ≡ Bθd,td − Bθx,td =
Γ
β
td
fd
−D · Γ,td , (8.18)
which is the equation (3.12) in the main text. Now consider Γ ≡ 1−βγ−β (1−γk)
δ
and
differentiate it with respect to td, considering the education technology from equation
(3.11). The result is
Γ,td =−
β
Γ
γ
δ
k · ε
(
fd
td
− z · Bθd,td
)
td
fd
, (8.19)
where  refers to the elasticity. Using equations (3.13) and (8.19), we obtain the
analytical solution for zBθd,td as follows:
zBθd,td =
zθd,td +
(
fxρz
(fd+fxρz)D + Γ(zΓ−β)
)
z · βΓ γδ k · ε · fdtd
1 +
(
fxρz
(fd+fxρz)D + Γ(zΓ−β)
)
z · βΓ γδ k · ε
. (8.20)
To obtain the analytical solution for zBθx,td , use equations (3.14) and (8.19). As a
result, we obtain:
zBθx,td =
zθx,td − z · γδ k · ε−
(
−D + fxρz(fd+fxρz)D + Γ(zΓ−β)
)
z · βΓ γδ k · ε ·
(
1− fd
td
)
1 +
(
fxρz
(fd+fxρz)D + Γ(zΓ−β)
)
z · βΓ γδ k · ε
.
(8.21)
8.6 Admissible parameter and necessary and sufficient con-
ditions
The sufficient condition for Bθx,td < 0 in the equation (3.14) can be seen graphically
in Figure 8.1. The blue curve shows ρz while the red one is the sufficient condition.
For the negative values of the red curve, the condition is satisfied. It can be noted
that this condition holds for the admissible parameter space used in the literature
(see Helpman et al., 2008a). Specifically, we set β = 0.75, γ = 1/3, δ/k = 3.5,k = 2.2,
τ = 1.5, A = A∗, z = 2.6, ε = 0.7, k = 2.2, fx/fd = 1.2, and c1 = 0.94. These values
imply a total government expenditure in education, equal to G = 0.3. For example,
they show that empirical studies estimate ρz ≈ 0.18, which makes the condition hold
clearly.
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Figure 8.1: Sufficient condition for Bθx,td < 0
The necessary and sufficient condition for ∂p¯iBx
∂td
> 0 in the equation 3.17 holds
always. This can be seen graphically in Figure 8.2. The blue curve shows ρz, as in
the previous figure. The red one is the ∂p¯iBx
∂td
> 0 condition. The condition is satisfied
for the negative values of the red curve. As in Figure 8.1, we use the admissible
parameter space in our theoretical model and the one used in the literature.
Figure 8.2: Necessary and sufficient condition for ∂p¯iBx
∂td
> 0
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9 Simulations
We report Table 9.1, which collects parameter values that are consistent with data
for major economies. We used values in this table for all the reported figures, unless
stated otherwise.
Table 9.1: Values for parameter and variables used for calibration
Parameter/variable Value Source/Explanation
γ
1/3
δ
7
k
2
Helpman et al. (2008a)
ε 0.7
fx/fd 1.6
fd/fe = fd 0.2
β 0.74 Bernard et al. (2007)
z 3.4
τ 1.3 Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
θmin 1
Normalisation
fe 1
Normalisation in exogenous case
(see Ghironi and Melitz (2005))
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